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7 How to Succeed without Really
Flying: The Japanese Aircraft
Industry and Japan's
Technology Ideology
David B. Friedman and Richard J. Samluels
7.1 Intro(luction
Since the end of World War II, the United States has spent billions of dollars
more on military research and development (R&D) than Japan has.' Even to-
day, despite a;In American recession and sustained increases in Japan's military
expenditures, Japanese annual defense R&D spending-less than 100 billion
yen-is dwarfed by U.S., spending of more than 5 trillion yen. In Japan official
defense R&D is just 5 percent of all government R&D, while in the United
States, government expenditures account for more than 60 percent.2 But de-
spite the enormous postwar American efforts to foster defense technologies, a
massive disparity in nominal spending, and the fact that Japan does not design
or build military equipment for export, Japanese commercial manufacturers
now exhibit dual-use production capabilities that match or exceed American
capabilities in mllny a;rcs.
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I. Differences in yen/dollar rates; nominal versus adjusted expenditures. and accounting con-
ventions make precise comparisons difficult. but American defense technology investments have.
by any ne;asure. beeni about two orders of magnitude beyond the Japancsc effort. For Japan. see
Bieich... Kikakubu (1991,35). For the United States. see Alexander, (1989).
2. B6ich ... Kikakubu (1991. 35).
3. Studies of the dependence of U.S. producers on Japanese and other foreign producers include
Analytic Science Corporation (1990); Office of 'lchnology Assessment (1989, 1990): Defense
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This has been possible, we argue, in part because Japanese views about tech-
nology and national security sharply diverge from comparable American be-
liefs. It is this divergence between U.S. and Japanese defense technology strat-
egies deriving from fundamentally different ideas about the economy and
national security that concerns us here. Cold War U.S. technology strategy
focused on making huge public outlays to specialized defense laboratories and
contracting firms, justified by thile military calculations of national security.
While American defense planners recognized that technologies developed for
the military might diffuse into the commercial economy, and many spin-offs-
such as jet engines or new materials-did occur, no special effort was made
to marry commercial and defense industrial capabilities. Indeed, American de-
fense prime contractors developed design, manufacturing, and business prac-
tices, or responded to secrecy and classification requirements in ways that im-
pcded effective exchanges of commercial and defense technology. While many
U.S. subcontractors mixed militarv and commercial technologies more freely
than the prinmes, they lacked the stability and resources necessary to expand
into new civilian markets.' Over time, "spin-away" rather than "spin-off" may
more accurately describe the relationship between U.S. military and civilian
manufacturing.
In contrast, Japan's firms have made little distinction between military and
civilian technology. They have focused instead on three principles: (I) ob-
taining and indigenizing foreign civilian and military design. development, and
manufacturing capabilities; (2) diffusing these capabilities as widely as pos-
siblec throughout the economy; and (3) nurturing and sustaining the primes
and subcontractors to which commercial and military technologies could be
diffused and from which indigenous development could be generated. Differ-
ences between military and civilian technologies were less important than dif-
f'erences between domestic capabilities and foreign dependence; making
things that "go bang in the night" was not as crucial as nurturing the more
fundamental ability to design and make "things' period. Whether these
things-machinery. electronics, aircraft, vehicles, and so forth-were for mili-
tary or commercial end use, the know-how enabling their production was dif-
fused aggressively throughout the Japanese economy as a matter of national
policy and private practice. Defense technology has been valued for its ability
to elevate the fundamental capacities of the economy as well as a means for
actually producing military hardware.
Cnicial to implementing Japan's technology and security ideology are for-
mal and informal linkages and bargains-which we call a system of proto-
cols-that integrate Japan's industrial technology community. Technology pro-
tocols, such as informal industry cooperation practices. regional and national
4. One study of the 350 largest companies and corporate divisions participating in the U.S.
defense industry shows that the top U.S. defense contractors rely on mrilitarv production for well
cver 8() percent of their output (Alexander 1993. 45).
---- 
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subcontractor associations,. R&D consortia, semnipublic industry research
groups. or vertical and horizontal industrial "cooperation" associations, over-
lap and bind Japanese producers in ways that create and preserve opportunities
for firmns to build alliances within the economy. These alliances-netaphori-
cally. sets of "open door" opportunities. or technology highways-stimulate
conmpetition while at the same time providing competitors with access to cru-
cial mnufaclturing know-hlow. They cnable Japanese irms to build and coii-
bine their skills with comparative ease to produce even the most complex prod-
ucts, including military equipment. Japanese defense production is simply one
of many technology linkages that firms maintain within the domestic economy.
Japan's defense prime contractors are Ifar less specialized than their American
counterparts, and subcontractors more readily combine defense and commer-
cial production in a wider range of industrial undertakings. As a consequence,
defense and comnmercial technologies interdil'use-tlhy spin-on and spin-off
to each other with comllparative case in Japan.
In this paper, we illustrate the industrial consequences of Japan's technology
and security ideology with the case of the aircraft industry. Aerospace provides
an ideal case because, as in the United States, it has received the lion's share
of military R&D expenditures, and aircraft production has been heavily geared
towards defensec flour-filths of Japan's output and two-thirds of American air-
craft production has been for the military. Commercial aircraft development
in Japan has been a major goal of industrialists and policymakers alike, and
has been cherished within the United States as one of the industries in which
America dominates global competition.
But the Japalnese and American aircraft industrial strategies and structures
have diverged. U.S. prime contractors and subcontractors heavily specialize in
aircraft production. At the prime level, this specialization has proceeded to the
point where there is a sharp, practically impenetrable barrier between civilian
and military aircraft operations even within the same firm. American aircraft
industry subcontractors more readily combine their commercial and defense
capabilities, but generally do not diversify into nonaerospace fields. Japanese
aircraft prines and subcontractors, however, are overwhelmingly dedicated to
nonaerospace comimercial production. The industry is, in effect, embedded in
the civilian economy as a whole. Japan's aerospace capabilities result from the
combination of skills possessed by companies whose primary business and
technology strategies are oriented toward other industries. The disjuncture be-
tween colmmercial and military, aircraft and nonaircraft production characteris-
tic of primes and subcontractors in America never emerged. Instead, even aero-
space producers in' Japan at the primne level, and especially the country's
subcontractors. have been able to spin-on to military applications nmany of the
fruits of their commercial investments, and spin-off defense skills for civilian
purposes. In tilis fashion. Japan hias built a thriving. if still small, aerospace
5. Acrop:lcc Ilutric,: ,\sc i;ticln of ni,\ierica (I 990). 22).
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sector, and it has used aircraft industry technologies to enhance commercial
and military capabilities throughout the economy. In short, judged by the crite-
ria of Japan's technology and security ideology, the aircraft industry has suc-
ceeded without really flying.
Section 7.2 outlines the three basic tenets of that ideology: indigenization,
diffusion, and nurturing. It shows that Japan has embraced and promulgated a
vision of national security that elevates local control, national learning, and
sustained development over the more conventional procurement criteria of
cost, performance, and delivery schedules that dominate in America. Section
7.3 suggests that the Japanese aircraft industry arguably has flourished when
measured in conventional terms of sales, output, profits, and growth, despite
common perceptions to the contrary. Section 7.4 contends that, even if the
caliber of Japan's aerospace capabilities is debatable in conventional terms, the
industry is a success under the criteria that inform Japanese industrial thinking.
Finally, in section 7.5 we conclude that, since differences in technology ideolo-
gies can lead to divergent standards for industrial achievement, different indus-
trial development trajectories, and political and economic conflict, America,
Japan, and the Asian region as a whole face significant conceptual and policy
challenges in the near future.
7.2 The Origins and Contours of Japan's Technology and
Security Ideology
From the moment Tokugawa Ieyasu united nation and state at the turn of the
seventeenth century, the Japanese people have been exhorted to make sacrifices
to enhance national security in a hostile world. At different times and in differ-
ent measures, this mobilization has mixed xenophobia, religion, militarism,
and nationalism. Japan's early industrialization was led by military industries
to enhance national security by "catching up and surpassing the West"( oitsuke,
oikose). Later, the Meiji era mobilization symbolized by the slogan, "Rich na-
tion, strong army," proved calamitous. In the postwar era, sheltered by the U.S.
security umbrella, Japanese citizens have been exhorted to sacrifice for more
purely commercial purposes.
Technology has been central to national security in three consistent ways:
( I) to achieve independence and autonom) through indigenization of technol-
ogy (koku.vanka); (2) to diffuse this learning throughout the economy (hakuluu);
and (3) to nurtulre and su.stain appropriate Japanese enterprises to which tech-
nical knowledge can be diffused and further refined (ikitsei).
Indigenization, diffusion, and nurturing derive from a pervasive sense that
Japan must compensate for its special vulnerabilities in a Hobbesian world.
This feeling of insecurity and vulnerability fitan) has been articulated repeat-
edly throughout Japanese history. In the eighteenth century, a Sendai noble-
man, Hayashi Shihei, warned the shogunate (roughly at the same time Alexan-
der I-laniilton similarly admonished the fledgling U.S. government) to protect
~~~~I-~~~~~~~~~~ ..~
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Japanese manufactures or face foreign domination. A century later, bridling at
having to purchase antiquated weapons from the west, Meiji leaders drove Ja-
pan to adopt "Western learning with Japanese spirit" (wakon yosai) while they
promoted a program of industrial nurturance (shokusan kdgy5).6 Following Ja-
pan's defeat in the Pacific war, Navy Minister Yonai Mitsumasa proclaimed,
"The loss of the war was a technological defeat."7 Informed by this perspec-
tive, and afforded the luxury of U.S. security guarantees, over the next half
century Japan set out to build its general technological capabilities to enhance
its national security.
The same perceived vulnerabilities that justified Japanese militarism also
influenced the country's commercial strategies. In postwar commercial Japan,
direct foreign invcestllents have been discouraged ill favor of joint ventures that
maximize technology transfers.' When domestic manufacturers have lacked
capabilities in key areas, they have typically elected to buy licenses rather than
to import products. Fundamental to Japan's technology and security ideology
is the belief that "security" means comprehensively building the nation's pro-
ductive and technological capabilities rather than simply amassing military
hardware. Japan has sought to compensate for economic, technological, politi-
cal, and social vulnerabilities that it believes demand special vigilance beyond
merely responding to military threats and enhancing military preparedness.
Japan's conception of "comprehensive security" (sog3 anzen hoshOl) is merely
the latest and most elaborate articulation of a technonational ideology that has
driven its security concerns for more than a century.
Indigenization, diffusion, and nurturing have been, and continue to be, the
core values that make up Japanese security thinking. Each reinforces the objec-
tives of the other; together, they undergird Japan's remarkably successful indus-
trial development. Technology indigenization is thought to be essential, so that,
at least, Japan can derive higher value fron cleading-edge design, mnanufactur-
ing, and production knowledge; at best, it can set the pace for world technology
development. Once indigenized, domestic technical knowledge diffusion is es-
sential, so that Japanese producers can collaborate to exploit fully the results
of their efforts while competing vigorously to ensure that ultimate commercial
(or military) applications are achieved. Finally. firms in Japan are nurtured and
sustained by a system of alliances and protocols, so that the knowledge that
has been diffused is not lost through calamitous economic dislocations (such
as business cycle swings, short-term capital shortages, commercial product
failures, market consolidations). Nurturing also assures that, in the future,
technology can be diffused to enterprises that have steadily absorbed design
and manufacturing knowledge. developing the economic wherewithal to pro-
duce first-rank products for civilian or military end-users.
6. Yanmazaki (1961. 19).
7. Macma (1 9'9. 16()).
8. Nla,()n ( I 992. }
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As used in this paper, ideology does not mean that Japanese or American
technology and security strategies have been determined solely by each nation's
national "culture." Rather, as each country has faced its own unique industrial
and security challenges, certain basic principles have emerged to guide debates
over how best it should respond. These ideas are now institutionalized through
years of' private and public practice, but they are not unchallngeable or inimmu-
table. Indeed, we argue below that by understanding the divergence between
U.S. and Japanese technology and security thinking, both nations may be able
to modify their actions and beliefs to improve bilateral and regional prospects.
In this fashion. we argue that ideology does shape a nation's choices about
technology and security but it does not determine them: change, learning, and
adaptation, however slow and halting, are not only possible but essential.
Let us explore the three interwoven strands of Japan's technology and secu-
rity ideology in Ilore dletail.
7.2. 1 Autonomny and Indigenization
Writing of the intellectual origins of modern Japanese bureaucratism, Tetsuo
Najita has explained Japan's "unadorned, yet pervasive perception" that na-
tional development is a nmatter of "autonomy," and that "national integrity" can
be achieved "only through economic power (fukoku)."" Japan's first national
research institutes were established by MITIs forerunner, the Ministry of Agri-
culture and Commerce, to fortify Japan, achieve independence from foreign
industrial products, and nmeect the Western imperialists on their own terms.'0
The Meiji leader Fukuz.awa Yukichi wrote in his classic treatise. The Outline
of Civilization (Bttlcirol rno gairyaku). that both civilization and wisdom
were necessary to protect the nation. Wisdom, he argued, could be learned
from abroad but was best nurtured and applied at home. From the start, influ-
ential Japanese taught that the advancement of independent knowledge and
scientific competence were as necessary as military power to achieve security.
In response, throughout the Meiji period Japan strove to learn Western tech-
nologies-particularly military technologies-and to indigenize them as soon
as possible. Foreign tutelage for national strength was enshrined in the Charter
Oath of the emperor Meiji in 1868: "Intellect and learning would be sought
throughout the world in order to establish the foundations of Empire."" Inde-
pendent arms manufacture based on imported foreign design and manufactur-
ing skills, the first modern industrial sector in the Meiji era, led Japan's forced
march to industrialization.
This process of indigenization is called kokusanka in Japanese. From Meiji
to the present. private and public procurement decisions have been guided by
the "three unwritten prinlciples of kokusanka: (I) domecstic supply: (2) if do-
9. Najit; (I 980() 6). Thisfikoku is norc familiar as the first halr of the Meiji cxhortation.fukoku
kv3licei ("Rich nation strnrg army") that defined Japan's course of niilita;ry tcchnonationdlisrn.
10. Kanitlni (1988).
i I. .ockv.oodtl ( 1955. 9). Sc Samulels (1992) for a fullcr account.
1 ------1111
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mestic supply is not possible. licenses should be secured using domestic manu-
facture and equipnlent; and (3) equipment should have broader application
than specific to the project for which purchased:'"1 In accordance with these
principles, in both military and civilian cases, each subsequent generation of
Japanese product has usually depended less than its predecessor on foreign
tecilnology. So crucial lhas kokusanka beell i Japanese Ihinking that some of
the most important debates over industrial development and industrial policy
in Japan have centered on how to achieve local control ot' knowledge.'-
The Defense Production Committee of Keidanren has justified kokusanka,
which it has championed, in at least five ways: () Japan's unique policy of
"defensive defense" requires different equipment than that manufactured in
Europe and North Anmerica: (2) the "special spirit and body size" of Japanese
military personnel, as well as Japan's special "land, water, and seas"; (3) licens-
ing hreclds dependence of tlhe licenser on the licensec, mIaking uplgrading dif'-
ficult; (4) licensers are less willing to transfer technology to Japan, now that
Japan's technological level has improved; and (5) codevelopnment with other
nations can succeed only if Japan has something of its own to offer.'4 The
significance of' this and numerous other similar arguments is its almost total
lack of any credible military rationale for autonomnous weapons developments.
Rather, koku.sanka is justified to avoid foreign dependence generally and to
specifically inprove Japan's bargaining position when obtaining technologies
from abroad. 'ok.usailka is nmore than self-serving propaganda at budget time;
it has been iplemented in Japan's procurement practice: using aggregate time-
series budgetary data, for instance. Bobrow and Hill found that Japanese mili-
tary budgets reflect military calculations only in part. In addition, autonomy
and dependence concerns explain a significant portion of Japan's defense prior-
ities.' 5
The stniggle for technological autonomy has not slackened now that Japan
has ernerged as a technological superpower. To the contrary, parity with the
United States (and the prospect of considerably more intimate bilateral trans-
fers of defense technology) is frequently used by industry and by the bureau-
cracy to justify demands for increased funding for scientific and technological
development and for accelerated koku.sanka."' A group of industrialists con-
vened by the Keidanrcn responded to demands fronl the United States for tech-
nology codevclopment by arguing for accelerated autonomous defense tech-
nology strategies to ensure against a U.S. technology blockade.'7
Efforts to achieve autonomy are also central to the process of Japan's interna-
12. Adachi (1981. 14).
13. Sce Anclordoguy ( 1989) for compu.crs: mNason (1988) for ;aitomobilcs and clcctronics:
Green ( 1991 ) fr dcfcnsc.
14. Kcizai . inkai (1976 3 1-33).
15. Bobrowv and I I i1 (1991. 55).
16. Ucda ( I ') I . for CX llepIc.
17. JiNkib . . !lI())).
.` _-_ -------- ------------ -------` 1'--------111-^-___
258 David B. Friedman and Richard J. Samuels
tional cooperation. Consider these opening lines of the most recent report on
promoting international cooperative aircraft development of the Japanese Ma-
chinery Industry Alliance and the International Aircraft Development Fund
(IADF):
It goes without saying that in order to secure a stable rank in international
society, it is essential to more fully utilize our nation's meager resources and,
moreover, to develop high level industrial technologies, leading the world.
In order to do this, we must stir up the will for a technological renovation
... as well as to reinforce and nurture the capability to develop technology
autonomously ... In order to overcome the fragility of our resource poverty
it is necessary to shift our policies of promoting a technology-based nation,
and establish our economic security: this is a major objective that we must
aim at especially now.'
A survey of Japanese defense production capabilities by the Mitsubishi Re-
search Institute in 1987 was even more blunt about the tactical use of interna-
tional cooperation to foster autonomous technology development in Japan:
"With the exception of some very advanced high technologies, the commercial
base (of Jalpanese electronics materials and vehicles technology is equal to or
better than in the United States and Western Europe. We anticipate progress in
commercial-led R&D for military application. However, in those areas of high
technology where domestic technology is behind, it will be necessary to sup-
plement [domestic efforts] with international cooperation."",
The drive to indigenize and autonomously control technology remains as
vital as ever in Japanese strategic thinking.
7.2.2 Diffusion
But it is not just a concern to indigenize and develop autonomous technical
capabilities that is noteworthy about Japan. After all. autonomy is widely ac-
cepted as a legitimate goal of every nation's security policy. But Japan is also
uniquely committed to diffusing technologies as broadly as possible through-
out the economy. In practice. technology is often treated as a quasi-public good
that is developed and distributed through elaborate networks of producers and
bureaucracies. Participants in the process believe that propriety technology can
be distinguished from generic information and that each contributes signifi-
cantly to Japanese national security. As a consequence, Japan has built an ex-
tensive network of "technology highways"-an infrastructure comprising at
least as many lanes, but perhaps fewer roadblocks, as its U.S. counterpart.
Indeed, because the Japanese system facilitates extensive inbound (but much
less otthoLnd) technology traffic from abroad, it is able to exploit the opportu-
18. Nihon Kikai ... Kikin (1991. i). The tcrm used in this tcxt is gijitsu rikkoku sokusli,i no
seisaku. Nakayama (19 91 ). suggests this can also be translatcd "a policy (if technonationalism:'
although most Japanese tend to restrict use of that term for U.S. policies of tchnoprotectionism.
19. Mlitsubi.hi Rcscarch institute. survey (1987. 34).
" c~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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nities other countries have created to promote technology exchanges as well.
As a result. Japanese technology highways more effectively acquire and diffuse
global and domestic technologies than similar systems in other countries.
Further, roadblocks impeding the interdiffusion of military and civilian
technologies are in evidence considerably less in Japan than in the United
States. Unlike in the Unitcd States, Japan's technology highways can accom-
modate automobiles. trucks, or tanks with equal facility. We noted above that
national power and industrial autonomy were interdependent in the view of
Meiji leaders. So too were military and civilian technologies. The first machine
tools were manulf'acturcd in a government arsenal in 1869, and modern conimmiu-
nications technology was first used by the army to suppress the Satsulma Rebel-
lion. As the acadellmic/bureaucrat Kobayashi Ushisaburo explained in 1922. the
diffusion of basic technologies initially absorbed for military purposes was
later crucial in building Japan's commercial industries.
While the manufaictured articles made as war materials are seldom fit for
general use, the tools and machines that manufacture them may for the most
part hbe used for making other kinds of articles wanted by the people at
large.... One industrial work is apt to cause anotlhecr of a similar kind, and
so on, and the result was the evolution of all sorts of new industries. But that
is not all. Workmen who had been employed and trained in the military
industry went to work elsewhere in private factories or started little works
of their own. (166)
Kobayashi's analysis rmains true today. The interdiffusion of military and
civilian prodlucts. process technologies, and skills has been of incalculable ben-
efit to Japanese national development. Indeed. it has become so ingrained that
Japanese managers often disclaim any interest in tracking the diffusion of mili-
tary technology because "we don't make any such distinction.":'
The low barriers to the interdiffusion of civilian and military technologies
profoundly shaped Japan's postwar development. The country's earliest export
successes. such as cameras, watches, and small machinery, were developed
under the supervision of former military engineers.2' Senior executives of
man) of Japan's most successful firms-including Morita Akio and Ibuka Mla-
saru. the founders of Sony-learned their first lessons about manufacturing
and technology management in the laboratories IanId factories of the Imperial
Naval Air Arsenal (Kugisho).
Once the United States began sourcing in Japan for goods and services dur-
ing the Korean War. Japanese firms used U.S. military procurement as a tech-
nological locomotive for the entire econoiny. This "special procurement" (to-
kitjit) resuscitatect then-moriblund Japanese industries hby transferring American
20. Interview. (;cner;Il Nianllgr Aircraft )ivision. Nlitislbishi ;c:ivy Industries. October 8.
1991. 1'hi i, vig musly denied by some NMITr and idustry associationl oficials (corrcspondclncc.
Fcbruary 3. 1993')) but is ;icknwlccdecd by otlihecr NMi'' ol'licials (intcrview. August 22. 1991).
2 I. ;lacia ( I 9,Ng. I ()).
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engine and machinery technologies, and introducing production, quality con-
trol, and manufacturing process know-how. '' According to surveys done in the
1960s for the Defense Production Committee of the Keidanren. military de-
mand, and especially technologies first introduced for military production such
as materials processing, wireless communications, and propulsion, actively
contributed to Japan's commercial economy for at least two decades after the
resumption of military production in 1952 (contrary to conventional wis-
doni).' Keidanren repeatedly demanded increased military production, claim-
ing that "the diffusion of modem weapons production raises the technological
level of general industry."24 Engineers noted in surveys that participation in
defense R&D "helps raise technological capabilities in other areas" such as
systems integration and design.25
In part because of the limited size of aerospace and defense production,
Japan's prime contractors make little distinction between military and civilian
products, except at final assembly, unlike U.S. primes that isolate much defense
from commercial production. Japanese components and subassemblies are
produced by and tested on the same equipment, regardless of the project for
which the equipment was initially obtained or the ministry from which subsid-
ies may have been initially derived at both the prime and supply levels. 26 As
long ago as 1966, more than 80 percent of the production equipment employed
in the manufacture of military products was used for nondefense products as
vell.27
Knowledge diffusion in Japan occurs at several levels, both inside and
among firms and between sectors. It is accomnplished through parallel, undif-
ferentiated efforts affecting both commercial and military technologies. In the
case of military production, the major defense contractors are diversified man-
ufacturing conglomerates that take special pains to establish mechanisms such
as project teams, extensive corporation-wide study groups, and technology fo-
cus centers for functional area specialists, to share know-how and experience
across divisional lines. Although Japanese prime contractors rarely transfer
engineering personnel across applications, they actively seek to transfer
knowledge accumulated in one area to others within the firm. 8
The result is a cadre of multifunctional design and manufacturing specialists
22. B6ei Kiki ... linkai (1968.49).
23. Ibid.; Keizai ... linkai. ed.. 1970.
24. Nihon ... K6gy6kai (1987. 57). We acknowledge that many of Keidanren's claim.s are
self-serving.
25. Keizai... Iinkai (1970. 180).
26. Kamala (1979) and our site visits to aerospace and defense plants f two of Jap;ans three
largest primni defense contr;ctors ()cccmbcr 1991).
27. c1i Kiki ... linkai (1968. 16fi). According to this survey. 80.000) to 92.000 machines were
put to military and nonmilitary use. Even in the -weapons ector. 83 percent of the production
equipment was general use. In military vehicles it was 97 percent.
28. Usually this is organized through the technology headquarters (gijuru hnbu) of the firm
(interviews with senior technology managers: Shin Mlciwa. Mitsubishi I lcavy Industries. Mitsubi-
shi Electric. Toshiba. Scptcnibcr-Dccembcr 199 I).
:i -----  _,_ 
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who understand their application area comprehensively and who are expected
to systematically diffuse their accomplishments company-wide. Even though
engineering and technical staff do not typically leave their specific application
areas, they each participate in every phase within the program from design to
production, and they participate in a range of intrafirm mechanisms that trans-
fer their knowledge. It has thus been comparatively easy for statistical quality
control appropriate for military production to diffuse throughout the machin-
ery industry divisions of Japanese primes, for commercial automated manufac-
turing processes to rationalize fighter aircraft parts production. beyond what
even the American licensers can achieve, or for aerospace materials to improve
automobile and bus body production.s' In the United States, prime contractor
defense production is something to protect, isolate, and classify within the
firm. Defense designers only design; process engineers focus only on produc-
tion. But in Japan. defense production is like any other resource for advanced
basic and process technologies within a firm, from which technological wis-
dom is to be tmined and integrated into the firm.
Technology also diffuses horizontally among competitors. Many of Japan's
technological capacities were fostered by novel and borrowed organizational
practices-institutions such as research consortia-that allow risk-averse
competitors to achieve common technical goals before they compete with each
other in the market. Japanese firms cooperate in consortia at every level of
the development cycle, including basic research, systems development, and,
especially in aircraft, manufacturing. While the form and function of these
consortia vary, every government program since the 1970s designed to support
technology development has provided incentives for additional collaborative
research. "'.
The research consortia are just one of several other "external" information
networks through which technology is exchanged, traded, or otherwise dif-
fused among competitors in Japan. These networks, coupled with public poli-
cies and private practices that are "delocalizing" Japanese research include
joint ventures. technology exchange agreements., cross-licensing, second
29. The diffusion f cotimmrcial automated machinery techniqucs in nonacrospace industries
to aerospace uses has been achieved both by Japanse prinmes and by sectoral suppliers who draw
on their expertise in other divisions to produce aircraft parts of higher quality and with greater
efficiency than their foreign licensers can achieve. The diffusion of statistical quality control tech-
niques has also flowed in the opposition direction, mediated by the technology headquarters of the
primes and facilitated by technology study activities undertaken by representatives of suppliers.
subcontractors, and the primes in joint consultation with each licensed production activity. Aero-
space production has also been used to obtain new materials technology. such as braking
devices. lightweight nmetalc. and norc pliable structural asemblics in train and bus construction
in Japan. Information derived in a series of interviews performed by us in 1991 involving site
visits to a major Japanese defense prime contractor in the aerospace sector and seven subcontrac-
tors of varying sizes and capabilities located in Kakamigahara. Gifu prefecture. Data collected
from these intcrviews in Japan shall be referred to as "Kalkamiga;lra ficld study. December
1991."
30. Lcevy and Samucls ( 1991).
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sourcing, production sharing, and a wide range of informal technology trading
and information sharing. Industry associations and regional and prefectural
manufacturer associations (kumliai) also provide opportunities for specialty
equipment or components vendors and subcontractors to exchange technologi-
cal information.' As we will see, efforts to stimulate multiple technology-
sharing relationships amlonlg competitors are particularly pronounced in the
aircraft industry.
An additional technology highway connects suppliers and their customers.
It extends to (and indeed defines) the vertical relationships among primes and
subcontractors and facilitates both upstream and downstream learning. Japa-
nese prine contracts have been the principal conduit through which knowledge
gleaned from licensed production is diffused to supplier and vendors. Typi-
cally, with each new project, subcontractors will dispatch teams of engineers
to the primes for several weeks or months of training to master design or manu-
facturing techniques imported from abroad. The primes will also provide tech-
nical guidance on equipment purchases such as autoclaves. new NC machinery,
or specialty composite materials technology."
There is also substantial bottom-up diffusion; indeed, one of the dominant
trends in Japanese manufacturing is the increased role subcontractors play as
specialists in applying technology to foster new products. As the subcontrac-
tors diversify into new fields, or undertake independent R&D, they often learn
unique tecllniques or skills that they spin-on to their old lines of work. This
knowledge is often transferred downstream in generic form, as the subcontrac-
tors beconc more involved in designing or manufacturing new products in
collaboration with other firms." As in the United States, prime defense con-
tractors are directly responsible for only a fraction of their nominal production.
A 1987 survey by the Mitsubishi Research Institute found that reliance by
primes upon their subcontractors for defense production was already high and
growing.'" The volume of upstream and downstream technology diffusion dif-
fers atnong companies and industries: downstream transfer may be compara-
tively rare in Japanese defense manufacturing, given the heavy influence of
licensed production. Nevertheless, it is yet another mechanism by which tech-
nologies flow between companies in Japan.
7.2.3 Nurturing
The third strand of Japan's technology security ideology, nurturing, is con-
cerned with creating the conditions under which domestic Firms can usefully
31. An example of a horizontal and a vertical organization designed to transfer technology to
supply networks is the Kawasaki Gilu Kytd6 Kumiai. descrihed in K;awasaki Gifu KyCbd5 Kumiai
( 199()) Kakamiga;lh:a Shiyakuslho ( 1987): Sancinoto (1989).
32. Kalkamig;lhara field study, l)cccihcr 1)9 I.
33. A discussion of bottoi-up engineering in the automobile indutry is provided in Wilack,
Jones. and Roos (1990. 104-37): Nishiguchi (1989. 183-94).
34. Nlitsubiqhi Research Institutc. survey (1987. 24).
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apply and retain the technical knowledge they obtain. Market shifts or techno-
logical revolutions can threaten long-term manufacturing capabilities if indus-
trial players-firms, workers, designers-are not able to respond without
threatening their very survival. It is therefore just as important to assure that
networks and industrial participants survive as it is to obtain or develop tech-
nology. As a director of Japan's Aircraft Technology Association explained,
Japanese industrial policy is about "targeting technology, not an industry. We
are nurturing capabilities, not a sector." '
Consistent with this philosophy, the Japancse have constructed an elaborate
systnem of protocols--soetillles tacit and sometilmes explicit-which induce
domestic firms, even as they compete, to constantly bargain and negotiate with
their managerial counterparts and with Japanese bureaucrats to share market
jurisdiction and control. These protocols-sometimes as simple as legitimacy
afforded to government advisory commissions or as complex as reciprocity
accumulated over decades of interaction-force interests as varied as the
largest industrial producers, small subcontractors, regional industrial associa-
tions, local and national bureaucrats, and financial institutions to take account
of each other's needs in shaping the economy. No single interest can ignore the
others in making and implementing industrial strategies; no one bureaucracy,
multinational firn, domestic industrial association, or union can significantly
disadvantage the others through unilateral decision making."
This systcmm contrasts with American views that collaboration is the same as
collusion and that economic competition is zero-sum. While U.S. economic
bureaucrats halve been historically preoccupied with the threat of excessive
market concentration, their Japanese counterparts have feared that excessive
competition mnay drive producers out of business that might otherwise contrib-
ute to the economy. Bargaining and negotiation protocols help ensure that busi-
ness cycles, differential access to capital, cutthroat regional development com-
petition, or large-firm market power, which typically generate enormous
industrial dislocation in other countries, are mediated so that even "sick" play-
ers have a chance to recover. and none moves too fr ahead of the other.
Consequently. small and large producers in Japan share the pain of eco-
nomic downturns to a greater degree than in the United States; capital is allo-
cated across the board to talented niche producers as well as brand-name cor-
porations; and regions are not subject to huge currents of investment and
disinvestment forcing painful social adjustments that endanger skills and man-
ufacturing know-how.'." Options to "exit" from the economy are made less at-
35. Interview. November 27, 1991.
36. Samuels callk this process of iterative bargaining amiong stable public and private actors
"reciprocal conscnt." I:or an extended discussion of efforts to descrihe the Jal);iese cconoiy 's
networks (if pmcr and ;authllrity. see Sanuels ( '197. 279-82).
37. I:riedmil (I1988. 129-34) describes how pstwar cyclical adjustments have increasingly
been bomrnc equally by larger and smaller firmnns. as thc "dual stricure" of the Japancse economy
receded in the rccnilt prid.
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tractive than collaborative strategies that progressively build the skills of indi-
vidual firms, regions, and the economy as a whole.'8 And when markets prove
irresistible and exit is unavoidable-as in the case of Japan's coal mining dis-
tricts in the 1960s-the state and consumers are expected to bear their "fair
share" of the costs involved in restructuring regions or industries.'9
Japanese nurturing strategies encompass the public, private, tacit, and ex-
plicit bargains that undergird the whole economy. Indeed, military production
is so embedded in the commercial economy in Japan that it is difficult to distin-
guish between support strategies applicable only to military or defense manu-
facturing. Nevertheless, in several instances, Japanese nurturing has had espe-
cially clear effects on the nation's defense capabilities.
One is lthe creation of geographical regions where arnis ianul'acturing
knowledge is systematically strengthened and then retained over time. Unlike
many American regions, such as the Rust Belt in general or Detroit in particu-
lar, Japanese industrial regions are "sticky"; once capital and technology flow
into a region, they almost never flow out."' After design. manufacturing, and
financial links are forged between producers and investors in specific indus-
tries, all of the participants exert considerable effort to keep them intact. In
lean times, to diversify their options or learn new skills, regional producers
often enter new industries, building relationships with new banks or firms. But
these relationships supplement, rather than destroy, existing ties. New regional
networks are built on top of the old.
Consequently, Japanese regions can sustain whole industries in suspended
animation; like pictures burned into a television screen, certain regional capac-
ities may dim with changing times, but they do not fade completely. Later, they
can flare again into sharp definition should circumstances permit. As we shall
see, this process has been characteristic of the aircraft industry. Immediately
after the war, and then again in the late 1970s, Japanese producers kept alive
the country's aerospace options during severe slumps by turning to other sec-
tors while awaiting new military or commercial opportunities. In the iminedi-
ate postwar period, aircraft industry intercorporate links were preserved for
close to a decade and a half without significant production. Then, as defense
orders blossomed in the early 1960s and commercial subcontracting expanded
in the 1980s, the same firms and personnel successfully resuscitated Japanese
aircraft production. Regional production skill development in Japan is cumula-
tive rather than disjunctive, as is often the case in America.
As we will see, this strategy has been crucial in developing Japan's defense
industries. Japanese military manufacturing has been limited by comparatively
low, cyclical military expenditures. But as the country's defense was sustained
by regional producers, aircraft, tank, or warship builders iniminized the poten-
38. Basic conccptS of exit. voicc. and/or loyalty in response to change arc first set forth in
f lirschman (1970).
39. See Lcsbriel (1991) and Samuels ( 1987. chap. 3) for reviews of this process.
40. See Friedman (1993) for an elahoration of sticky regions.
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tial loss of accumulated know-how and skills during lean times. and could
more readily meet the nation's procurement requirements as conditions
changed for the better." ' Not incidentally, they were also positioned to further
enhance their capabilities through imports of foreign technologies or commer-
cial R&D.
Horizontal and vertical relationships between firms also nurture long-term
stability and skill retention by preventing debilitating intercorporate struggles
for power. On the horizontal dimension (as we describe below in the case of
aircraft), Japan's defense industry has been shaped by collaborative arrange-
ments between the largest firms, which seem to ensure that each participates
in at least a piece of every ma jor project. Substantial market consolidations
that would f'orce Illay llilitary production participants out of tile industry-
typical in other countries-rarely occur. Rather, historical players, and occa-
sional new entrants. are able to share in learning and applying defense-
related technology.
Similarly, primes and subcontractors have developed relationships that en-
hance skill retention by reducing the kinds of intercorporate exploitation that
frequently threatens the existence of smaller producers in many other coun-
tries. In mnuch of the prewar period and in the early postwar economy, Japanese
primes-consistent with current and historical American practices-used
their subcontractors as shock absorbers when the economy turned sour. Con-
certed political action on behalf of suppliers and subcontractors. the rise of
producer associations that could bargain with the primnes and with the govern-
ment, the provision of massive financial and technological support to smaller
firms, and the decline of mass, standardized production in Japan largely re-
versed this trend."2
Today, it is unusual for larger Japanese firms to force their supply networks
to bear unequally the costs of economic adjustments. Indeed, when asked if
they do, Japanese defense production managers often express genuine surprise
that prime contractors in other countries.could, or would want to, treat their
suppliers in this fashion."' Conversely, representatives of U.S. primes and de-
fense subcontractors are usually puzzled that the Japanese would not take ad-
41. An unpublished survey by the Mitsubishi Research Institute found in 1987 that "surge"
capability in most sectors is considerable-ranging from 1.5 to 10 times current production during
a rapid mobilization-including the rapid conversion of capital equipment in most sectors.
42. See Friedman (1988). See also Nishiguchi (1989) for discussion of the collaborative manu-
facturing strategies that have come to characterize Japanese manufacturing networks. In essence,
Japanese firmni both large and small rely on each other to market and produce the subsystems in
which they pecialize. As a result. it becomes extremely difficult for a large firm to cast off its
smaller firm suppliers in bad time. since it is frequently closely relying on those firms for indis-
pcnsable subsystcins. technology. and manufacturing skills. See also the discussion by Asamnuina
( 1989. 1-3()). It states that Japanese firms increasingly specialize and rely on each other's skills in
manufacturing hierarchies. which mitigates against buffer roles that would tend to disadvantage
one pan of the hierarchy to the advantage of another.
43. Kakaini;lahar licld study. Decemnber 1991.
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vantage of their suppliers to cushion themselves from nmarket shocks. ' The
dense local, regional, national, political, and industrial networks that shape
how firms are vertically organized in Japan do not facilitate the "cut and run"
strategies typical in the United States. Rather, Japanese primes and subcontrac-
tors share market pain and grow together during economic upturns. The result
is that the country's defense suppliers are better able to retain their military
production skills, and can more easily experiment over the long tenrm with spin-
ons and spin-offs involving commercial and defense applications.
Japanese beliefs about the strategic contributions of technology to national
security have therefore generated a national commitment to indigenizing tech-
nology. diffusing it throughout the economy, and nurturing firms that could
benefit from indigenization and diffusion. Pursued separately and measured in
conventional economic terms, each has effects that are costly and inefficient.
Pursued jointly and understood in their ideological context, these principles
have led to industrial strength and national security. Indeed, they have helped
create a defense industry-if not an entire economy-organized differently
than is typical in America. Industries are valued for the knowledge that they
provide as well as for the products they can make. Relations between industrial
players are guided less by price considerations than by the desire to continu-
ously amass and apply knowledge over the long term.
In making this claim, however, we are not arguing that the defense sector in
Japan has been the most important source of technology for the Japanese econ-
omvly as a whole. Rather, as Japan's security and technology ideology has played
out in practice, defense production has been subsumed within the commercial
base, and defense technology is simply one of several technology options that
Japanese firms engaged primarily in commercial production can and do draw
upon. Further, we do not claim that this outcome resulted from state control,
that industry has uniformly triumphed over politicians, that it has been uncon-
tested politically, or that Japan's responses were preordained in accordance
with the nation's basic security and technology ideology.
Finally. nothing about Japanese strategies reflects cultural peculiarities; non-
Japanese thinkers such as Joseph Schumpeter and Friederich List have put
forth ideas that coincide closely with the country's technology and security
ideology. Schumpeter's claim that technology is the central component of eco-
nomic competitiveness resonates throughout Japanese economic practice.4" So
does List's argument that a nation's independence and security depends on the
independence and vitality of its manufacturers. 4 ' Japanese industrialists, secu-
44. Information regarding the manufacturing strategy, financial position. and intercorporate
links in the Ul.S. aircraft industry is derived in part fronm a series of ficid interviews we conducted.
first in Puget Sound. Washington. Januar)' 1992 with a major defense and commercial prime con-
tractor aInd six affiliated subcontractors. and interviews with subcontractors in Los Angeles in
January 1992. The Puget Sound study will be referred to hereinafter as "Puget Sound field study.
January 19'2": tihe Los Angeles interviews will be referred to as "Los Angeles ticld study. Janu-
arv 1992:'
45. Schumnpeter (1950)).
46. List ( 1927).
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rity planners. and policyniakers have been more inforined by Schumpeter's
belief in the centrality of technology and List's belief in the importance of
domestic industrial and technological capabilities, than have their counterparts
in America and other nations where different principles were widely adopted.
Autonomy. diffusion, and nurturing, the core values of Japan's technology ide-
ology, may not be uniquely Japanese, but Japan combined them to generate
effective industrial practices, public policies, and criteria measuring the suc-
cess of an entire industry. Japan is demonstrating that a nation may have less
need for an explicit technology strategy if it embraces ideology that holds tech-
nology to be strategic. This is nowhere nmore apparent than in the case of the
Japanese aircraft industry.
7.3 Aircraft Production and the Japanese Security Ideology
By the early 1990s, the Japanese aircraft industry was small but growing
and carefully cultivated. Yet it is widely regarded ats a failure. Certainly, the
Japanese industry remains small by international standards. It is barely one-
fifteenth the size of its $110 billion U.S. counterpart. Its exports are less than
0. I percent of U.S. aircraft exports, and the production of the entire industry
is just 10 percent of the production of Toyota Motors alone. It is less than
2 percent the size of the Japanese electronics or automobile industries. Few
completed airplanes are built-just 188 in 1989 compared to 2,448 civil and
1,227 military aircraft in the same year for the United States.47 No airline flies
more than a handful of Japanese aircraft, and those that are flown are vintage-
1960 YS-II turboprops. The largest aeroengine manufacturer, Ishikawajima
Harima Heavy Industries (IHI), has never designed and sold a commercial jet
engine. How successful has Japanese industrial policy been? Has Japanese air-
craft production been as disappointing as many suggest? Let us explore an-
swers both conventional and unconventional.
Explanations for the "failure" of Japanese commercial aircraft production
typically include some or all of the following. '"
Late start. Between 1945 and 1952, the U.S. occupation prohibited aircraft
production. Japan missed the start of the jet engine technology age and has
been behind ever since. Licensing established knowledge is a good way to keep
up; it is no(t a good way to get ahead.
Military dependence. For the past several decades, 70-80 percent of Japanese
aircraft production has been for the Japan Defense Agency (JDA). Japanese
47. Acrospace Industries Association of America ( 990. 3-31 ): Ono ( 1991. 15): data include
transports. helicopters. and gencral aviation craft.
48. This litany is recited variously in Nihon Ritchi Sentaa (1982): Abegglen (991): Nihon ...
K6gy6kai (1979): NMoxon. Rochl. and Truitt (1987): Long Term Credit Bank of Japan (1986):
Frenkcl ( 19,84): Kecizai I)' iikai ( 1979): Nlowrcy. (19)87): Ruhin (1983).
268 I)avid B. Friedman and Richard J. Samuels
government policy prohibits the export of military aircraft, and so the Japa-
nese aircraft industry has had few opportunities to achieve economies of scale.
Small domestic market. Japanese travelers rely on trains rather than aircraft,
and Japanese domestic airlines carry only 5 percent of the world's airline pas-
sengers.4" This small home market makes it impossible for Japan to repeat the
protected inflant industry strategy that worked so well in steel and automobiles.
Laxck of systems integration and design skills. Licensed production has de-
prived Japanese manufacturers of the opportunity to learn how to integrate
complex aircraft systems. The point of successful design and systems integra-
tion is that the whole is imorce than the sum of its parts.
Inabilitv to provide adclclte aftermarket support. Japanese manufacturers
lack an established marketing network in a global market where a large per-
centage of sales conies after delivery and payment for the original equipment.
Inalpropriate industrial structre. Japanese heavy industrial firms are highly
diversified, and not one of Japan's prime contractors specializes in either air-
frames or engines. Within the parents firms, the aircraft divisions have long
been viewed as "poor cousins" that drain resources. Parent firms, with a con-
siderable range of other options, reportedly have viewed aircraft as too risky.
I'rohibitivlei high ,entryl co.t. This risk aversion is related to high entry costs.
'lhe cost per unit sold of' aircraft is the inverse of that for integrated circuits.
'lhe significantly greater value added combines with the significantly smaller
number of units sold to make aircraft a high risk. It is easier and more attractive
to continue as coordinated, subsidized subcontractors than to set out as inde-
pendent competitors.
I'owerfdlforeign competitors. There are only three major integrated commer-
cial airframe manufacturers in the world. The $29 billion Boeing Company
enjoys more than half the world's civil transport market and has full order
books into the twenty-first century. Airbus, now the number-two producer,
needed billions in subsidies to enter the market. Today Japanese aircraft pro-
ducers probably face even more substantial competition.
This is a formidable set of claims for one of Japan's more conspicuous com-
mercial failures, but on consideration each claim becomes less compelling. In
conventional terms the industry's performance is, at the very least, mixed.
lite starts c'an be atvantageous. As the Japanese machinery industry denion-
slr;licd in tihe Nlciji pcriold and as the electronics industry ihas shown niore
49. Frcnkcl ( 1984)S; Kciai D~yfl;kai (1979. 70).
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recently. a late start is not a permanent handicap and may even be an advantage.
Later developers avoid the expensive mistakes made by market pioneers. Japa-
nese firms have systematically learned from established world producers. The
question is not whether latecomers will catch up but whether leaders will con-
tinue to innovate.
Ailitary l')o(uction ((1 provile flexibility. experience. ad stability. Military
procurement actually provides substantial advantages. Though less profitable
than commercial markets, military demand is more stable. Low barriers be-
tween mnilitary and civilian production enable producers to train and maintain
a cadre of aerospace engineers and to nurture key technologies while preparing
to conipte in comnmercial markets. Moreover, gaps in Japan's technological
capabilities can be and are reduced by defense programs. Finally, Japan's aero-
space Inilitary dependence is not high by international standards, and commer-
cial projects have followed nlilitary ones in Japan as elsewhere. Uchino Kenji,
former vice president of the Commercial Airplane Company (the firm estab-
lished to organize the subcontracting for Boeing's 767), has observed that "we
cannot nurture an industry from collaborative development in commercial air-
craft. The only way is to use military demand ... to bring along civilian [de-
mand].": " While the commercial market is more attractive to Japanese produc-
ers who look to wean themselves from dependence on the JDA, commercial
production is neither a replacement for nor adversely affected by military
delmand.
Domestic market .i.c is largely irrl'vl(ll. ike most markets for Japanese
manufactures, the aircraft market is global. In the early 1980s, Japanese firms
shifted strategy to cash in on significant opportunities as subcontractors and
components manufacturers.' Even after the 1985 yen revaluation, which
should have redied Japanese exports and increased imports, exports increased
57.6 percent and imports decreased 27.1 percent.'5 Total nominal exports in-
creased by nearly 40 percent between 1989 and 1991. and nominal exports do
not include much electronics equipment and displays. The Society of Japanese
Aerospace Companies (SJAC) projects exports will continue to grow at twice
the rate of total production, amounting to more than 15 percent of total produc-
tion by 1994." In absolute tenrms, reported exports rose from $290 million in
1987 to $538 million in 1989; these figures, compiled by the Ministry of Fi-
nance, exclude exports of generic electronics, materials, or components. Ex-
50. Quoted i T;lka;c ( 1' 7t. 15).
51. Scc. Ir cxalillc. thlt "1 .tn 'lcrill Vixiotl" (f' IIc (ciclt (1 J;l1I;iiCse cr(c; le Coirmpalics.
produced in 1 ')'0.
52. Kukil;l( 190. 43).
53. \Aeroslpactc Jaatl, November 199 1. 29. This is partly accounted for by an expected decline
in ili;itar prcdouctitll. uil lthc FS-X colnes on lile.
- . .. , , ,. I, . I I.i,.,1 .111ti 161.114L d J. .'dIIIU'I
ports reached nearly $I billion in 1991-growth of more than 200 percent in
four years.54
Japan's domestic production steadily expanded from a very low base in both
relative and absolute terms. In 1983, Japanese aircraft output was about one-
thirtieth that of its U.S. competitors. In 1985, it was one-twentieth. In the early
1990s, it was one-fifteenth the size. In absolute terms, aircraft production rose
nearly 250 percent between 1978 and 1988 alone and grew at nearly twice the
rate (10 percent) of the Japanese economy (5.7 percent). Between 1981 and
1989, the Japanese aircraft industry grew slightly faster than the French, Brit-
ish, Canadian, or U.S. industries. Its growth lagged behind only Italy in the
global industry. The industry is positioned for a near-term future in which 30
percent of the value added of' aircraft will conic from corpotnents, up from the
current 20 percent.
Clearly, Japanese strategists have found a method-"international collabo-
ration"--to overcome their small domestic market. 55 The calculation is quite
deliberate-it' Japanese airlines must import finished products, Japanese man-
ufacturers should supply as high a share of the value added in those products
as possible. One analyst observed sardonically that "the four Heavy Industries
will never admit it publicly, but they are merely 'parts makers.' Everything in
Japanese commercial aircraft is ;parts. Everyone knows this, but it is a matter
of pride not to acknowledge it." '5 Still, derision aside, this has been a high
growth strategy, as seen in table 7.1. Further, in 1990, the aircraft and engine
divisions of Japan's heavy industrial parent firms enjoyed significantly higher
operating profits than did tile parent firms overall. Profits for aircraft systems/
components divisions were 5.9 percent, versus 6.5 percent for the parent firms
overall; those for engines/airframe divisions were 5.0 percent versus 3.3
percent.5"
Althougl'h the industry's output declined slightly in 1993 due to the global
recession and flagging Boeing orders, Japan's global aircraft industry entry
strategy is overcoming its small domestic market limitations, generating sus-
tained, if not spectacular, volume expansion, financial achievements, and
growth in technical capabilities.
Jap(ln alrc'ady possesses, and readily can develop, systems integration and de-
sign skills. Japanese aircraft producers have already demonstrated the capabil-
ity to design high-quality aircraft, and each of the major airframe makers has
touted the "paperless" airplane-designed by computer-as the next chal-
lenge.
54. Using a different base line, SJAC reports that aircraft imports by Japanese airlines increased
by nearly 1 16 percent betwcen 1975 and 1984. By this calculation, Japan's trade deficit in aircraft-
industry manufactured goods has continued to widen (private correspondence. Fehruary 3, 1993).
55. Adachi outlined this strategy in 1981: Kukita did so in 1990.
56. Interview, former official. SJAC. November 27. 1991.
57. Chfgin Sgo6 Kenky0jo (1991, 104). SJAC reports, however. that net profits for the aircraft
and engine divisions remnained lower than for the parent firms.
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Table 7.1 Japanese Aircraft Production, 1983 and 1988 (billion yen)
Commercial
Military Domestic Export
1983 1988 1983 1988 1983 1988
Aircraft (including helicopters) 109.9 188.6 0.5 - 8.4 9.2
Fuselage parts 28.9 68.7 2.3 32.8 4.3 37.0
Engines 52.0 56.0 2.0 - - 1.1
Engine parts 21.3 36.2 5.3 11.8 1.1 5.5
Other parts
Landing gear 0.96 1.6 . -
Propcllers/rotors 2.1 0.1 - 0. I - 0. 1
Auxiliary equipment 2.9 17.8 0.0)4 0.6 1.1 1.1
Actuators 1.3 11.5 0.01 0.1 0.2 1.3
Power systems - 0.8 -
Instruments 10.6 22.2 2.0) 0. (). I 0.9
Avionics 9.5 31.6 0.4 - -(). I
Training equipment 5.6 10.3 0.4 -
Other components (seats. galleys.
lights, entertainmcnt system) 5.1 0.4 0.1 - 0.3 1.4
Soarce: Nihon ... K0gy6kai ( 1992).
Note: These data are based on a survey of thirty-three large firms that excludes auto consumption.
Toray and other materials makers, virtually all below-first-tier subcontractors, and repairs/mainte-
nance. As a consequenec. they probably underestimate the scope and breadth of the industry by a
significant extent.
Through "mere" licensed production, Japanese producers obtain complex
manufacturing knowledge and (in design changes) glimpse how major produc-
ers integrate new technology or parts into a completed aircraft.5' Kukita Sa-
nemori demonstrates in a series of case studies-including hydraulic systems,
air pressure and climate control systems, automated flight management sys-
tems, surveillance radars. and fuel systems-how licensed production has
combined with domnestic projects and international collaboration to provide
both the know-how and the market access that have enabled equipment suppli-
ers to challenge foreign manufacturers. Over time, many Japanese firms have
become key subsysteuts suppliers or even sole sources for products they once
licensed.5" According to data published by the Japanese National Institute of
Science and Technology Policy, the number of patent applications in aerospace
in the United States between 1971 and 1984 was virtually unchanged, while
58. Even machinists in extremely small shops will frequently redesign components that they
make for the largest American primes. Moreover. even quite small subcontractors have CAD/
CAM systemis that can use digitized data to create on-screen cutting paths and blueprints. which
subcontractors can then manipulate in collaboration with tlhe primel to enhance part quality (Puget
Sound field study. January 1992).
59. Kukita ( 1')9(1. 66). Tijin Seiki, a division of the larger textile firm. is now sole source of
flight control equipment for Mcl)onnell Douglas's MD- I I and is designing the equipment for the
MD-12. Its experience with the Defense Agency's T-2 CCV jet trainer qualified it to supply fly-
by-wirc flight controlls for the Being 777.
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during this same period the number more than doubled in Japan. " ' Finally, we
note that Japanese manufacturers have considerable experience with other
kinds of complex systems, including nuclear power plants, satellites, and the
most elaborate rail transport network in the world.
Coml)onents prm(itction ad( subcontracting make after-service capabilities
less importanlt. The absence of a worldwide service network for Japanese air-
craft products would be a critical problem if the Japanese actually wanted to
build and sell their own commercial transports. But this goal is not an im-
portant part of Japan's short- to medium-term aerospace strategy. In the longer
term,. there is little question about Japan's ambition to design. build, market,
and service its own aircraft. We are reminded that the absence of a service
network, faced by Sony in the 1960s and Toyota and Nissan in the 1970s, has
been ovecome by other Japanese producers.
Japan aircraft industrial structure is a strength, not a wleakness. Unlike U.S.
aircraft manufacturers, Japanese producers build aircraft and construction
equipment. nuclear power plants, and machine tools and jet engines. Eighty-
five percent of the combined sales of Japan's major airframe and engine manu-
facturers is in nonaerospace businesses, compared to only 40 percent of the
combined sales of U.S. manufacturers. Total sales of the entire Japanese air-
craft industry are a small fraction of Boeing's or McDonnell Douglas's, but
total sales of individual heavy industrial firms are larger than the total sales of
ally single foreign aircraft manufacturer save Boeing. As a consequence, Japa-
nese firms enjoy enormous flexibility in deploying their considerable re-
sources, in combining military and commercial capabilities, in marrying air-
craft and nonaircraft production skills. By the late 1970s, the value-added rates
of their aircraft businesses surpassed that in other sectors, and as a conse-
clucnce manufacturers found it easier to compete for capital within their firms.
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries' (MHI) aerospace sales, for example, grew 50
percent in the early 1980s, catapulting its aerospace division from last to first
among seven. During the same period, IHI's engine business, once the weakest
in a diversified portfolio of shipbuilding and machinery production, became
the most profitable division in the firm. Highly innovative sectors, such as new
materials and electronics, in which these firms excel, provide opportunities for
rapid spin-on of nonacrospace technologies. As John Alic observes, "The fam-
ily of design ncethods, production processes. and inspection techniques rc-
quired for polymer matrix composites-ranging from filament winding to ul-
trasonic inspection-represents a shift as great as that faced in earlier years by
the electronics industry in moving from vacuum tubes to transistors to inte-
grated circuits.""' Moreover. Japanese aerospace firms learned much earlier
60. Kagaku Gijutsuchi Shigen Chosajo ( 1987, 86).
61. Alic ( 1989. 20).
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than their foreign competitors how to share tasks and collaborate on major
projects-one of the most important factors driving technological diffusion
and reducing risks in the economy.
These structural advantages are acknowledged in a detailed report of Japan's
IADE, which argues that the fact the industry does not focus on aircraft is
a source of' strength. The ability to apply advanced technologies in different
businesses within the same firm "deepens the capabilities of the company and
provides Japanese aircraft-related firms strength beyond what is visible.""2
Entry costs are less signlific(ant for componelnts manufacturing and sulbcon-
troLling. Japanese producers do not currently have the physical infrastructure
to produce commercial transports for the wvorld market. But while the level of
capital investment is still small by global standards, investments in aerospace-
related capital equipment and the operating expenses of the top twenty-four
Japanese aerospace producers have increased very rapidly: in 1975, total in-
vestment in aerospace-related capital equipment and operating expenses was
8.5 billion yen: in 1980, it was 52.3 billion yen; and in 1988 (even before
tooling for the Boeing 777 began), it reached 85.6 billion yen. Government-
endorsed strategies. such as risk-sharing subcontracting with overseas produc-
ers, and access to the enormous financial resources of keiretsu firms, further
reduce entry barriers. Finally. in 1993, the JDA began construction of Japan's
first high-altitude test facility, intended as a "means of research and develop-
ment for the Japanese aviation industry [and tol enable Japan to establish an
integrated development and production system, to include design, experimen-
tal production, testing. and volume production."' In Japan, aircraft are seen as
integrated systems of the highest-technology, high-value-added components.
The process of integrating these components adds value still.
Linmited ntnber of global comipetitors an facilitate mnarket participation.
Global market leaders are willing to cede portions of their aircraft production
to Japanese manufacturers inthe expectation of sales to Japanese airlines. Ex-
ploiting their leverage, Japanese firms have insisted on becoming integrated
into the design phase. In every successive project with Boeing, for example,
Japanese suppliers have achieved a larger work share and greater technological
responsibilities. According to one analysis, 70 percent of Boeing's foreign pro-
curement for the 767 came from Japanese firms, and Japanese designers are
nosw intcgratcd directly into the dceveloplnent and egineering plhase of tihe
777.','
Despite contractual restrictions, Japanese producers seem able to apply
knowledge leaned front one foreign partnership to work with another-one
62. Nihon Kikai ... Kikin (1991, 7).
63. Afuinichli Shimlhun, December 29, 1992.
64. Fuji ( 1990. 7). Bocing officials claim that this figure is far too high and that they "cannot
recreate" it (corrcsp ondcnlcc. June 1(). 1992).
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well-known case is Boeing "Supplier of the Year Award" winner Fuji Heavy
Industries (FHI), which provides McDonnell Douglas with composite fuselage
subassemblies that it first learned to produce under contract with Boeing. Simi-
larly, Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) developed a fuselage panel mounting
tool for Airbus from its commercial experiences with Boeing, enabling Airbus
to perfom' tasks it was previously unable to achieve. 65 A variety of military
and commercial producers and engine makers contract with the same Japanese
firms (see appendix A).
At the very least Japans aerospace producers have found a growing, profit-
able niche in the global industry and are far from a failure in conventional
terms. Their strategy, to "develop the equipment used in the world's aircraft"
rather than build complete aircraft, has already paid substantial dividends. 66
While the Japanese aircraft industry remains small, it has begun to succeed
without really flying.
But there is mIore to the story than building aircraft and components. Mea-
sured against the criteria of Japan's technology and security ideology, the in-
dustry's success is far more unambiguous. Aerospace producers have achieved
a remarkable degree of technological autonomy and have strengthened the do-
mestic technology base. They have helped diffuse advanced technologies
widely in the domestic economy. Finally, Japanese companies have nurtured
relationships among producers so that acquired knowledge could be sustained
and applied over the long term to aircraft production and to "unrelated" civil-
ian industries.
7.4 Aircraft and Japan's Technology and Security Ideology
7.4.1 Indigenization: The Paradox of Autonomy through Dependence
Perhaps the most significant feature of the Japanese aircraft industry is the
staggering number of technology-transfer relationships-including joint ven-
tures, licenses, coproduction and codevelopment programs, maintenance, ret-
rofit and overhaul contracts-it has sustained with leading-edge foreign mili-
tary and commercial producers. There is no authoritative public accounting of
these relationships, and those accounts that are available are widely divergent.
According to unpublished data compiled by the Machinery and Information
Industries Bureau of MITI, 556 separate inbound licensing agreements de-
signed to acquire technologies applicable to aircraft production were comp-
leted between 1952 and 1987.7 The SJAC, on the other hand, lists 672 active
licensing relationships in 1992.6' According to a study recently completed by
tile U.S. congressional Office of Technology Assessment ( 1991). in fiscal year
65. Interview. U.S. aerospace executive. Tokyo. Novembcr 8, 1991.
66. Nihon ... Kgy6kai (1987, 39).
67. Data provided by Aircraft and Ordinance Division. MITI.
68. Nihon ... K6gy6kai (1992).
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1991 alone. Japanese royalties to the United States for aerospace licenses were
reported to be to $816 million, roughly the same amount as Japan's official
defense R&D budget. According to Department of Defense data, payments to
the United States for military aircraft licenses (over the life of a program) can
be as high as $2 billion for the SH-60J helicopter, $1.9 billion for the F-15,
and $900 million for the P-3C antisubmarine aircraft; payments for missile
systems amount to hundreds of millions of dollars each, and the licensed sale
of Raytheon's Patriot missile is expected to result in a flowback of $2.4 billion
to the United States. Excluding direct sales of U.S. military equipment under
the terms of the Foreign Military Sales Program and current air defense and
ground programs-excluding aircraft-will result in license fees of $3.9 bil-
lion over the course of these programs. Aircraft coproduction and licensing
fees may add another $5.9 billion."9
Large firms may have dozens of' suchl technology a;greemennts with foreign
firms, and it is not uncommon for even mcediunm-tier suppliers to have ten to
fifteen separate aerospace technology-transfer agreements with U.S. and Euro-
pean firms.'" Consider the representative relationships shown in table 7.2.
Japanese aerospace producers use alliances with U.S. manufacturers to ac-
cumulate skills with broad competitive implications. Each of Japan's prime air-
craft contractors has now worked with a range of U.S. licensers. As we shall
see below, not only has this strategy enhanced the capabilities of each partici-
pant, but by maintaining stable alliances among the primes and their vendors,
knowledge gleaned fronm international collaborations has been diffused
througholut the cconomy. Even the Technical Research and Development Insti-
tute, the agency responsible for indigenization within the JDA. acknowledged
the massive benctfits of licensed production.
We began indigenous production based upon the introduction of licenses for
U.S. and other military equipment. Although these new technologies were
intended directly for military purposes, the special technologies to manufac-
ture these exceptional products spilled over into the commercial world and
before long they found their way into every area of the economy-superior
large scale systems engineering, environmental testing, quality reliability
control-such that it is impossible to ignore the huge contributions that li-
censed military production made to the rapid elevation of our nation's indus-
trial technology base.... Even now, for a variety of reasons, in a variety of
areas, licensed production continues to enable us to absorb many advanced
foreign techtnoloies."I'
69. Uncl;,;silicd data. current as of Jul) 1989. mn.,de available by the Mutual Defense Assistance
Office. U.S. E.mbiassy. Tokyo.
70. According to published conipanvy data. Tcijin Sciki. a Japanlese aircraft supplier, had fifteen
"major tecllnlogical coopcration agreemnnts: including a long-term joint venture housed with
Suldstrand (STS Crp: another Japancse subcontractor. Kokukikaku K6gy6 (Acro-spec Products.
Inc.). a compllnyi of 250 cmployees. sustains thirteen "tcchnology tie-ups" with U.S. and German
producers.
71. Beicho .. . . I lohu (1977. 36).
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Table 7.2 (continued)
Trading Company Representation
Motorola displays. radar equipment
Perkin-Elmer optical equipment
Systron-Donner security systems
Tcled'yne Brown Engineering displays
Teledyne Ryan Fllcctronics doppler avionics
Tracor Aerospace chaff/flare dispenser
Westinghouse Electric target drones
Source: Niholl ... KOgyCokai (1992).
Technology-transfer arrangements include virtually all phases of commer-
cial and military aircraft production, including airframes, electronic and me-
chanical equipment, and materials. Domestic firms specialize and operate as
nodes within the Japanese economy for accessing and indigenizing foreign
technologies applicable for aircraft production. As one senior procurement
manager explained his company's military sourcing strategy, "First, we deter-
mine if a Japanese firin makes the required part or equipment. If not, then we
try to find a domestic company that can either develop the capability quickly
or obtain it from abroad. If not, we are forced to import. Then we worry about
price and delivery." And while Japanese aircraft industrialists often argue that
in commercial procurement there is less concern with indigenization, when
asked they rarely recall an instance when a foreign company displaced orders
let to Japanese firms despite countless instances where domestic companies
displaced overseas producers. 7 2
Consequently. Japanese aircraft industrial development, centered on military
systems. las followed a nearly linear path in which successive projects usu-
ally-but not alwayss-have a larger domestic share than the previous ones.
When successive projects do create significant foreign dependencies as in the
case of the F-15, internal program licensing is used to close these gaps as
noted above. Japanese firms eventually became key subcontractors to the F-15
program through licensing even though they lacked indigenous capabilities at
the outset." Further, subsequent projects are often designed to acquire or au-
tonomously produce the technical skills or products that were not indigenized
in earlier aircraft prograrns.'
72. Kakamigahara field study. December 199 1. An SJAC official provides four examples involv-
ing hinges and serrated plate for the Bocing 767 subcontractcd by KIII (corrcspoidecncc. February
3. 1993).
73. Aboulafa (1991. 11-12).
74. The FS-X is such a program. See Samuels and Whipplec (1989). Further. a respected aecro-
space reference scrvice notes: "Ihc size or nature of the threat Japan faces is not the primary
consideration in the manufacture of the SX-3 [FS-XY]. Rather. it is an effort to acquire the design
and manufacturing know-how necessary to create a first-rate indigenous jet fighter. The SX-3 will
not be canceled for hudgectary reasons. or because 'peace has broken out'" (Aboulafa 1991).
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In this way, Japan has been able to transform itself from a buyer to a devel-
oper of weapons systems, including jet fighters. Indeed, this process took place
quite rapidly. In the early 1950s, Japanese defense aircraft were supplied by
the United States. and then were purchased with borrowed funds. Within a
decade and a half after the 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, and
after numnerous technology transfer, retrofit, and overhaul agreements with
(largely) U.S. firms, Japanese companies were able to provide most of the com-
ponents and perform the final assembly for almost all of Japan's military air-
craft:7'
Licensed productioni, retrofit, overhaul, and coproduction arrangcments are
sometimes denigrated by foreign observers as transferring only the most lim-
ited technical or manufacturing knowledge. Japanese producers are said to
learn simple "metal bending" or the "how" but not the "why" of aerospace
production.' It is true that since 1952 Japanese firms have licensed or copro-
duced nineteen different U.S. airplanes and helicopters without developing a
significant "fly-away" industry of its own. Licensed production does not teach
everything the licensee needs to know to build a domestic industry, nor does it
ensure the indigenous financial commitment required to establish a world-class
aerospace industry. But, as the JDA openly acknowledges, Japan's aircraft tech-
nology indigenization effort has nevertheless enhanced its military and civilian
industrial capabilities in several ways.77
First, Japanese producers obtain from their licensed production and retrofit/
overhaul activities extensive basic production knowledge, including blueprints,
machining techniques, quality control methods, and design methodologies. In
some instances, U.S. licensers even provide the informal notes skilled machin-
ists had made concerning manufacturing "tricks" they had learned in American
factories." Japanese firms use U.S. manufacturing standards and testing tech-
niques to set goals for their own operations. Unless prohibited by contract,
they typically develop their own manufacturing plans (including NC machine
75. This includes virtually all ships 99 percent) and ammunition (87 percent). The Japanese
Ordnance Associatiun claims that thcsc figures would be evcn higher if Japan were not forced to
purchase American weapons for political purposes. See Asahi Shimbun Shakaibu (1987, 116).
Note also that the gun mounts, radar displays, data link receivers, VHF receivers, instrument dis-
plays. 20-mm guns. radar, and inertial navigation system of the F-ISJ are made in Japan. Adachi
(1981) reports that in June 1955 virtually all the components of the T-33 and F-86 jets were
"knock-down" kits supplied by the U.S. Air Force. But within two years. domestic content was 48
percent. Likewise, in the first phase of the F-104 project (Japan's follow-on to the F-86). less than
15 percent of the electronics were manufactured in Japan. In the second phase of the project. this
figure rose to over 8() percent. By 1975. less thian 5 percent of Japan's military equipment was
supplied from abroad.
76. For a review of skeptical arguments relating to the effects of licensing. see the sources and
materials cited in footnote 50 above; also interview. Boeing Asian managerial staff, July 1991.
77. For an official (and controversial) evaluation of how coproduction of U.S. militar) systems
was used by Japanese contractors to enhance commercial technological development. see U.S.
General Accouinting Office (1982). The Delense Agency.s own I)efensre of Japan (1976 and 1988)
details the way Japanese finns have Iearned fronm licensing U.S. military technologies.
78. lall and Johnson (1970).
_ ___I __ _ __
-, I III -I & . J1 1 .,I,.W Ii I I 1 e I A .1. U
-L ,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
routes) and quality control systems in an effort to meet or exceed American
standards. They have been notably successful: the defect rate for Japanese parts
can be ten to ifteen times less than that for imported products made by the
licenser or the original vendor.7"
Licensed production and retrofit/overhaul work also stimulates cost control
and manufacturing process improvements. Japanese priimes and their subcon-
tractors 'ire able to learn tlhe best process practices of American aircraft comipa-
nies and then set out to improve upon them. they have become so proficient
that, unlike COClilon praclicc with other countries, most foreign licensers now
siimply prwidc projcct specilications oil the assullpt ion that Japanise produc-
tion skills tllatch or exceed their own. Japanese supplier firms lead the world in
automated, flexible aerospace parts production capabilities, which can increase
actual machine tool cutting time from 60 to 9() percent. They also readily spin-
on process technologies that they employ in other industries to improve on the
standards they have learned from licenser companies. In some instances, air-
craft producers measure their process technology success not by the standards
of foreign aerospace firms but by the capabilities demonstrated by their nonair-
craft production facilities."'
Nor do initially limited roles with foreign producers preclude more exten-
sive design/systemls integration opportunities. CAD-CAM equipment and spe-
cialized design divisions are a ubiquitous feature of even the smallest Japanese
aircraft subcontractor doing build-to-print work for larger firms, suggesting a
commitment to learning design skills together with manufacturing tech-
niques.f' From the inception of Japan's postwar aircraft technology tie-ups, do-
mestic producers have participated in, or have themselves generated, program
change orders that provide opportunities-if small in scope-to design sub-
systems or parts. Occasionally, Japanese firms have improved on U.S. designs
with autonomous developments, solving structural or design problems with
ingenious solutions. In 1991 alone, Japanese firms submitted 775 engineering
change proposal's (ECPs) to their U.S. coproduction partners. These ECPs pro-
vide general technical descriptions of engineering changes aimed at improving
existing U.S. designs and production. Among these were 341 changes to the
Patriot missile systemn. Five ECPs for the SH-60 helicopter have now been
incorporated as part of Sikorsky's design. as have Japanese enhancements of
the Lockheed P-3C antisubmarine aircraft. s '
Further. as they have increasingly mastered sophisticated manufacturing
processes, Japanese aircraft companies have insisted on sharing in the design
of new commercial and military aircraft. In 199 1, over 250 Japanese engineers
were resident at Bocing facilities in the United States, and in 1993 designers
7t1. Kak;aiig:dhtra lie hl stimdy. J;:imary I 992.
80. Ibid.
X8. Ihid.
82. Personal c,lrc,,llcdcnc. Mulall Dcfcn9c9 As;islncc ()lic. U.S. Emhasy. 'lkyo. I;cbru-
ary 7. 1992.
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in Japan will soon be on line with Boeing's American computers to work on the
777. On the military side. Japan was induced by the United States to abandon a
totally indigenous fighter project in favor of the FS-X codevelopment deal with
General Dynamics.8 ' At the very least, Japanese designers can obtain advice
regarding their proposed designs by collaborating with experienced foreign
engineers. But they are also now involved at the ground floor in world-class
commercial design efforts like the 777, as well as advanced, if not cutting-
edge, military development projects such as the FS-X and Patriot missile sys-
tems. In 1990, the governments of Japan and the United States agreed to pursue
three military codevelopment projects, including ducted rocket engines.
Finally, years of pursuing aircraft licensed production, retrofitting. and over-
haul work have indigenized ancillary industries, most notably machine tools
and their electronic controllers. The NC machinery industry in the United
States was initially created precisely to meet new machining needs for military
aircraft. But licensed production enabled Japanese machine tool producers to
adapt their products for the aerospace industry. In short order, they displaced
American or European equipment in most Japanese factories, and then made
significant inroads into Ul.S. facilities as well. Indeed, while American machin-
ery still can be observed in U.S. and even some Japanese facilities, it is usually
older in vintage than Japanese equipment. American aircraft prime and sub-
contractor managers often ruefully confess that their next purchase will be a
Japanese product. A similar process can be observed in selected components
and materials where specialist Japanese producers of items such as flight con-
trollers or plastics have emerged as sole or dominant sourccs for many foreign
llnu fact urers.'
Japanese indigenization contrasts with American strategies. U.S. firms, un-
like their Japanese competitors, actively transfer technologies abroad. In part
because U.S. programs are so mature by the time foreign production begins,
U.S. finns make comparatively little effort, however, to obtain significant flow-
back of process, manufacturing, or design skills from the overseas firms to
which they transfer technology. While it is typical for American managers in-
volved in joint ventures or licensing programs to tour Japanese plants once or
twice a year, few have developed a systematic program to monitor or acquire
Japanese practices. 8
83. Noble (1992).
84. Friedman (1988, 26-32); see also Noble (1984). The Puget Sound. Kakamigahara. and
Los Angeles field studies. 1991-92. suggcstcd current machinery purchases by both primes and
subcontractors in America and Japan were of Japancieequipment. Some Japanese primes initially
purchased Anerican machines during the late 1'96s' and 1970s. but those thiat still have function-
ing American equipment are' replacing them with new Japanese equipment.
85. According to one engineer involved in the FS-X General Dynamics/NHI collaboration in
Nagoya. General Dynamics placed"' ove seventy engi'neers on site in a special building at the MHI
plant. none of whom spoke Japanese flueiy. (Later. Japanese-speaking employees were added.)
He reported Japanese designers frequently held detailed technical nieceings either before the
Americans come to work. or more frequently: after they leave at 5:0() .s.
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Japanese industrial leaders recognized early on the role of the aircraft indus-
try in fostering technology indigenization in the economy. A Keidanren report
concluded that "because [licensed military] aircraft technology has to respond
to a demanding environment with high reliability, small scale, and light weight,
it will clearly have a positive effect on commercial aircraft development and
production, as well as on other general industries.""' Indeed, by learning how
to meet demanding industrial standards, producing new equipment and materi-
als, and increasingly applying design skills to aerospace systems integration
projects, the Japanese industry has fashioned an impressive (but as yet incom-
pletely documented) record of commercial spin-offs of military technology
that, taken together, constitute substantial indigenization of technology., 7
7.4.2 Diffusion: From Highways to Jetways
The aircraft industry has also accomplished a remarkable degree of technol-
ogy and manufacturing diffusion throughout the economy along four dimen-
sions: (1) horizontally, between major domestic prime contractors; (2) verti-
cally, among primes, subcontractors, and suppliers; (3) across military and
commercial aircraft applications; and (4) between aircraft manufacturing and
unrelated industries.
That aircraft manufacturing is valued in Japan for its capacity to promote
diffusion has been evident in several influential industrial and policy analyses
of the industry. MITI's famous 1970 "Vision," which identified aerospace, nu-
clear power, and information as Japan's three future "strategic" industries,
treated ;aerospace as the archetypal "knowlcdge-intcnsive" sector that must be
fostered for its capacity to stimulate widespread advances in economic capabil-
ities. MITI depicted the industry's links to other industries in the form of a
tree, whose roots (key materials, fabrication, control, and processing techno-
logies) bear fruit in the form of innumerable products in virtually every other
part of the econonm'y, such as vehicles, machinery, energy, electronics, leisure,
and housing.?8
Even more revealing is the way that the Japanese aircraft industry itself char-
acterizes why aerospace is important when bidding for financial support before
an often skeptical political or bureaucratic audience. An official industry post-
war history cites the four major contributions aerospace made to Japan in the
86. Kikai ... linkai (1965. 283-84).
87. Comprehensive data regarding Japanese spin-offs from the defense industry to commercial
uses are not available due to Japanese domestic and intrniational political concerns. One of the
few public sources, compiled in appendix B. describes a series of spin-offs from postwar military
projects to the Japanese commercial sector as compiled by the Kcidanren. which has incentives.
of course. to portray the ancillary benefits of defense spending in as positive a light as possible.
Given the magnitude of funding for these projects. some spin-off is to be expected. Whether or
not this justifies the expenditure is an empiri6al question awaiting mnore definitive analysis.
88. See Nihon ... K6gy6kai (1987. 47-49); Keizai D6yUkai (1979); and K6kiki ... Bukai
(1985) for rpresentative statements of this "roots to fruits" metaphor. Samuels and Whipple
(1989) reproduce the tree.
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following order: (1) the aircraft industry's knowledge intensity raised the level
of the industrial base as a whole; (2) its high value added secured the Japanese
economic base; (3) it contributed to Japanese national security by building
defense systems; and (4) it contributed to the national transport system. 89 In
this recitation, the industry's effect on national transportation is far down on
the list. Contributions to industrial knowledge and economic capabilities gen-
erally are more highly touted.
In practice, the most striking evidence of a concern for diffusion is the sys-
tematic way that key prime contractors repeatedly cooperate in major aero-
space programs in Japan. The Japanese aircraft industry is unlike any other
industry in Japan in the extent to which rivals collaborate. Competition be-
tween primes is usually limited to upstream, precontract R&D. Downstream
production and sales functions are accomplished in an exceptionally coopera-
tive manner. Each of Japan's prime contractors has played a role in every major
postwar aerospace project. While the firms compete to become prime contrac-
tors for JDA, they do so in the knowledge that their competition will not be
winner take all. Failed bidders routinely become subcontractors and receive a
fixed work share and participation in the design or licensing process.9'
It is little different on the commercial side. The same airframe manufactur-
ers who were partners in the domestic YS- I (and every military project) are
again cooperating as risk-sharing subcontractors in the Boeing 767 and 777
projects. KHI. MHI, and FHI share indirectly public funding through the
IADF, created in 1986 to provide them guidance on prospective projects and
loans. As a result of collaboration through this fund, these firms have created
nominally independent "development corporations" to coordinate their collab-
oration in the 767, the 777, and other projects. They partner also with IHI in
the Japan Aero-Engine Corporation-another IADF project to coordinate their
collaboration with the V2500 engine project with Rolls-Royce and Pratt and
Whitney (see table 7.3).
In short, the Japanese aircraft business is a cozy "friendship club" (naka-
yoshi kurnabu) in which each of the participants has, over decades of coopera-
tion, become intimately familiar with the capabilities of each of the others. 9'
One defense contractor from the more competitive electronics sector said sar-
donically that "in aircraft, like in construction, it's all rigged f[lango]."
89. Nihon ... Kogy6kai ( 1987, 41).
9(). In a typical case, a Japanese prime will subcontract over 65 percent of its total business: 20
percent goes to other primes: 45 percent is directed to domestic specialist parts suppliers: 17
percent is accounted for by work let to "backshops" or manufacturers with close links to the
primes: and 18 percent is spent on imports (derived. with permission. from proprietary data re-
ccived from one of Japan's primc aircraft contractors. January 1992). Sources indicated that they
had knowledge of other primes' subcontracting ratios, and that thcy were generally similar. For a
related account of the U.S. case. see Kurth ( 1990).
91. For example. the plant managers of Japan's two largest aerospace works. MiHI-Nagoya and
KHI-Gifu. worked together on collaborative projects in both the military and civilian sectors-
hoth in Japan and in Seattle (interview. December 18. 1991).
92. Interview. senior manager. October 28. 1991.
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Table 7.3 Selected Postwar Japanese Aircraft Projects
Japanese Prime Project Licenser












Fuji Heavy Industries T-34 Beechcraft
T- I Domestic
T-3 Domestic
Nihon Kokuki YS-I I Domestic
Shii Mlciwa PS-I Domestic
US- I Domestic
Solurce: Ono ( 1')9 I).
While some attribute this collaboration to the rising costs of aircraft projects
(each being roughly four times that of the previous one) and to the fact that the
number of projects has declined overall, in other economies the number of
firms would have been reduced in response to the same pressures. But in Japan,
partners are considerably more stable, even if they are simultaneously competi-
tors. Sharing tasks. rather than ruthless industry consolidation, is the strategy
most consistent with the diffusion goals of Japan's technology and security ide-
ology.
Keidatnren has been a leader in exhorting horizontal collaboration. In a 1965
report. it acknowledged that large-scale projects required the integration of
enormously complex technologies from disparate fields. It urged that interfirm,
interdisciplinary teanms of engineers be created to undertake national projects:
"While it is valuable that each firm in the aircraft industry undertakes its own
research and development, it is even more important that each specialized firm
come together in a comprehensive body in a spirit of fellowship, and that
govenlment-business cooperation be achieved '."' Or. as a former deputy direc-
tor of the MITI Aircraft and Ordinance Division put it, "When the Japanese
aircraft industry was provided chances to develop aircraft, almost all related
comnpanics, dctermining each other's comparative advantage in advance, shared
the tasks and integrated the work.... Through this process it was possible to
take a step-by-step approach. In other words, the Japanese aircraft industry did
93. Kikai ... linkai ( I ,65. 22).
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not simultaneously pursue more than one or two projects.... it put to use what
was learned in previous projects, explored new areas. and strengthened its
technological base.'""
Private firm strategies closely track these sentiments. Companies argue for
their inclusion in major projects, for example, on the grounds that technology
diffusion will help them, and the economy as a whole, compete against the rest
oft the world. In 1986, when the Japanese government's Key Technology Center
subsidized the country's advanced turboprop (ATP) engine project, corporate
participants, many of whom duplicated each others skills and capabilities, var-
iously justified their roles on the basis of () how much the project would
contribute to their ability to "confront Western makers" (MHI and Sumitomo
Precision); (2) the capacity to expand Japanese global Inarket share (Ishikawa-
jiima Ilarima Heavy Industries); or (3) "to be able to compete with Western
firmns" (FHI). Each of the leading participants also saw clear linkages between
the ATP project and their commercial activities. KHI and Kobe Steel both ex-
pressed their expectation that the ATP project would afford access to advanced
equipment and the "application of the results to other business activities.""
The ATP engine project is only one of at least a dozen separate consortia in
aircraft propulsion. materials, or components that are undertaken with public
support in Japan. In each case, virtually all of the major industry players are
assured a substantial role. While Japanese firms compete vigorously, this vigor
has its limits, and competition is rarely allowed to compromise prospects for
access to resources that would stimulate technological advantage for domestic
firms or the nation.
As in the United States, technology also diffuses through the vertical links
that bind Japanese primes to their suppliers and subcontractors. Like many
other industries in Japan, subcontracting is vital to aircraft manufacturing.
Roughly 7() percent of Japanese aerospace work is subcontracted by the lead-
ing primes. Each maintains roughly 300-500 direct relationships with domes-
tic materials, components. and parts vendors.'" As the primes develop their
networks of suppliers and affiliated firms, which in turn resubcontract, thou-
sands of Japanese firms throughout the economy participate in the industry.
As we shall see, unlike U.S. cases, these relationships are often exceptionally
durable; like the nakavoshi kurabt the primes have created, subcontractors and
suppliers, organized into horizontal cooperation associations ('rokui-kai) or
vertical regional producer associations (kutliai), are each able to assure access
to technology and skills from the primes in a fashion that does not favor or
exclude selected firms, but diffuses knowledge as widely as possible.
94. Hasegawa (1987. 14).
95. Nihon Kiban GCijutsu Sentaa. internal planning documcnt, 1987.
')6. Derived, with permission. from proprictary data received fron one of Japancsc prime air-
craft contractors. January 1992.
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But unlike most sectors in Japan, aircraft industry subcontractors-and even
many suppliers-have not yet assumed primary responsibility for product de-
sign and integration. The heavy emphasis on military and commercial licens-
ing or subcontracting has generated what is usually a one-way flow of knowl-
edge from thile primes, or the specialist suppliers that have direct technology
tie-ups of their own. to lower-tier producers."7 In most cases, technology or
manufacturilng know-how is transmitted at the start of each commercial or mil-
itary project when a team of engineers from the subcontractors will be dis-
patched to the primes for weeks or months of detailed training. The subcon-
tractors are instructed in the techniques, quality goals, design specifications,
and production roles that the primes have negotiated with their foreign part-
ners. After bth sides are satislied that the subcontractors comprehend their
tasks aid can nmeet the production objectives of the project, the teatm will return
to their firni and begin to apply what they have learned.
Over te course of the project, the subcontractors and primes monitor per-
formancc and solve production problems in a number of ways. A steady stream
of supplier and subcontractor engineers and technical staff interact with their
counterparts at the primes on close to a daily basis. Each subcontractor is also
subjected to at least an annual, and sometilmes a six-month, inspection during
which a detailed report card, which actually grades the subcontractor in a vari-
ety of categories on an A-D basis, is generated. This report is then often used
as an action plan by the subcontractor to upgrade its capabilities and perfor-
nlance."9
Many subcontractors also hire retired technical staff of the primes to obtain
production knowledge or, in effect, to buy direct access to the prime's re-
sources through the retiree's personal contacts. Through these and other regu-
lar contacts. primes and subcontractors exchange advice concerning manufac-
turing equipment purchases or other capital investments that will affect their
collective capabilities to compete for and meet contract goals. NC machinery
purchases for aircraft production are made in close consultation with the prime,
97. In fact. incc tilc subcontractors have little opportunity in the industry to develop unique
manufacturing niches as in most other sector, in Japan. and arc required by JA regulations to
supply detailed linancial data to the primnes. thcy are extremely protective of heir technology.
Their primary conomIic leverage comes from developing some niethod for producing parts that
the prime can make. and has a good idea of the cost for making, at a price that cams a profit. One
strategy. using lowecr-wage workers. is increasingly diflicult because of the labor shortage in Japan.
No one will work i factories for a fraction of wages they could carn elsewhere. More common
are elfforts to devise new cutting methods or use novel equipment to hbeat the prinime's cost standard.
Very few subcontractors stated that they would freely supply such knowledge to the primes, al-
though. when qucried. they could not explain how they could assure that frequent visitors from
the primes, or former prime employees. would not obtain such knowledge. There are, howevcr,
examples where subcontractors do teach larger firmns (like electrochemical machining technology)
how It use tecltol( gics that they iported into Japan (Ka;kainigahara licld study. Dcmcinber
1991 .
99. Ibid.
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to complement or supplement the prime's internal machining capabilities, and
to assure that the selected machinery meets required standards. Purchases of
large-scale equipment such as autoclaves for metal bonding or composite man-
ufacturing by subcontractors are similarly coordinated With substantial input
from the primes."9 In this fashion, supplier and subcontractors use their rela-
tionship with the primes to secure access to defense and commercial aircraft
tcchnolooics.
The third axis of aircraft industry diffusion is between commercial and de-
fense technologies. It is uniformly the case at the prime, subcontractor, and
supplier level in Japan that commercial and military work are performed by
the same shop personnel on the same equipment, usually in the same facility.
At the prime level, large-scale projects are often managed by individuals who
have, over time, become specialized in specific programs. But despite legal
formal proscriptions, the interdiffusion of military with commercial aircraft
production is apparent everywhere else. The same work groups, on the same
machines, will produce batches of parts for jet fighters, missiles, and Airbus
or Boeing with equal facility in the same day. Scattered around a typical fac-
tory are pallets of work intermingling titanium F-15 components, hardened
missile cases, and aluminumnl 767, MD- I , or A-321 fuselage parts. Indigenous
trainers such as the T-4 are equipped by teams that can and do shift with ease
to civilian projects. Blueprints for military and commercial aircraft are stacked
next to, if not on top of, one another in even the largest factory. And in assem-
bly areas, military aircraft take shape next to subassemblies for commercial
transports. "'x
Finally, there is substantial diffusion between aircraft technt!logies-com-
mercial and military-and the general economy. A 1979 SJAC survey esti-
mated, for instance, that the sales generated by products derived from aircraft
industry technologies were sixteen times greater than other products the same
technologies produced. In addition, the report concluded that there were sub-
stantial economy-wide process improvements fostered by the aircraft indus-
try's production-technique diffusion: "Elevating the product quality in other
industries through quality control systems designed for the aircraft industry
was a consequence that began with the licensed production of aircraft and air-
craft parts that rapidly spread, so that today quality control is just common
sense in every sector, regardless of the scale of the firm." ""
A decade later, SJAC completed Japan's most detailed study of technology
diffusion between the aircraft industry and sixteen other sectors, identifying a
range of mechanisms by which technologies are transferred."' In the case of
submersible craft, marine engineers were dispatched to the aircraft divisions
of their parent firms for training and for the collection of data on materials
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid. and Nl141 lield study. IDcccmber 1991.
10()1. Nihon . . . Kgy6kai (1979. 6).
I '02. Nihon ... K19kni (185).
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and manufacturing processes. They also received "technical leadership" from
competing submersible manufacturers. In the -case of the space industry, engi-
neers and designers were transferred in-house across divisions to take advan-
tage of their experience in aircraft materials and testing. The study also found
that aircraft engine technology was transferred through technical exchanges
between large and small manufacturers, through joint development projects
involving users and makers, through technology exchange agreements between
engine makers and systems controls manufacturers, and through the active use
of "controlled leaks' of technological information. ""
All told, the report suggests that product and process technologies in nine
different aerospace areas, including general systems and control technologies,
aerodynamics, flight control technologies, structural technologies, materials,
electronics, and testing were applied in thirteen different product areas in the
Japanese automobile industry, including shock absorbers, clutch linings, fuel
tanks, air bags. manufacturing process controls and so forth. Aircraft know-
how also contributed to the manufacture of submarines (materials, design, test-
ing), industrial machinery (CAM, locknuts, materials), robots (encoders,
alloys), materials (fabrication, design), petrochemicals (fasteners, high-
function synthetic materials, sports equipment, tires), and electronics (dis-
plays. computers, switches). The study documented more than five hundred
cases of technology diffusion, 60 percent of which originated in the aircraft
sector. "".
The capacity to spin-on or spin-off commercial and military aircraft techno-
logies to other industries varies with the scale and organization of the firms
involved. The process is least impressive at the prime level. Although Japanese
primes are generally smaller divisions of larger, nonaerospace companies, they
usually house their aircraft facilities in factories geographically separated from
the rest of their commercial activities. Few workers, engineers, or managerial
staff members are ever transferred interdivisionally. Yet most primes report
that they foster interdivisional diffusion on a more systematic basis, by creating
elaborate networks of research committees assigned to consolidate a firm's
knowledge of technology in specific functional areas. At Shin Meiwa and at
MHI, for example. the technology headquarters sponsors firmwide study teams
that coordinate at both the plant and corporate level on functional topics such
as electrical machinery, heat treatment, inspection, and so forth. Each study
team meets quarterly to enable engineers responsible for disparate applications
within diversilied firlls to share their know-how."'"
Thus, despite the physical isolation of aircraft operations from other divi-
sions at the prime level, there is considerable evidence of technology interdif-
fusion. In constructing an advanced phased-array radar (APAR) for the FS-X
103. Ibid.. 208-9.
1()4. Ibid.. 23 1.
105. M1ll1. Kakanigahara field study. Decchber 1991: intcrview. general manager. Shin NMciwa
Industrics. October 1I8. 1 )) I.
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project, for example. Japanese engineers from Mitsubishi Electric's radar
group briefly transferred to Mitsubishi Electric's (ELCO's) electronic de-
vices group. where they received training in the gallium arsenide (GaAs) chip
manufacturing technology they needed to make APAR high-frequency tran-
sponder modules. Leveraging MELCO's GaAs commercial memory technol-
ogy. they were able to produce, with just a fraction of the government R&D
support American firms received,. an APAR prototype that umany regard as
fairly close to leading-edge U.S. capabilities. Aircraft and nonaerospace tech-
nology interdiffusion, with significant strategic implications. does occur even
inside Japanese primes. ""
Japanese subcontractors and suppliers achieve even more systematic inter-
diffusion of aerospace and nonaerospace technologies because their aircraft
production is less segregated from other activities. Unlike the United States,
Japanese lower-tier producers are primarily nortaircraft manufacturers. Typi-
cally, 80-90 percent of their production is in nonaircraft industries: top-caliber
aerospace mnnulfacturing operations occupy just a corner of their facilities."'
The resulting direct combination of aircraft and nonaircraft production in Japa-
nese subcontracting plants facilitates an enormous cross-fertilization of tech-
nologies and skills. Consider four examples of this process.'""
1. In one case. a firm of about 250 employees originally specialized in pack-
aing for air defense ordnance and general machining. lb enhance its capabili-
ties, it imported electrochemical machining (ECM) technology from the
United States and began using ECM techniques for Japanese aircraft produc-
tion. To stimulate sales, the company launched a number of workshops for
both primes and subcontractors, and began to supply technical support and
machinery to implement ECM in Japanese aerospace factories. As demand
for sophisticated routing and milling technology increased in the automobile
industry, it adapted ECM technology for use in making auto parts. The firm
now designs and builds an electrochemical device (ECD) for nonaerospace
parts producers that is based almost entirely on the ECM technology it origi-
nally imported for aircraft industry use. One year after development, 15 percent
of the firm's revenue was accounted for by ECD sales, which were expected to
grow to 45 percent by 1993.
2. Cross-fertilization can also occur in a less direct fashion. A well-
established aerospace machine-shop subcontractor of about one hundred em-
ployeecs discovered that chip removal for the sophisticated NC machine tools
involved in aircraft production was quite difficult. It began experimenting with
conveyor systems and telescopic covers for NC equipment, forming a joint
venture with a German firm to import technology. At present, the company has
designed and produced. under its own nameplate. world-renowned conveyors
106. Intervic. general manager. MELCO Radar Group. October 8. 1991.
107. Kakamigahara field study. )Dccmuiber 1991.
1(08. All examples are from ibid.
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and covers and has nmade sales throughout .lapan and the world. It also produces
the speciality machines required to make the conveyors. While remaining an
integral part of the Japanese aircraft industry's subcontracting network and par-
ticipating in several prime contractors. the firm relies on aerospace work for
just 15 percent of its revenues: machine tool accessories now account for about
85 percent of its business and nearly all of its profits.
3. A third example of the enormous cross-industrial interdiffusion Japanese
aircraft subcontractors and suppliers can achieve is the case of a plastics and
seat manufacturer. While a first-tier aerospace supplier. the company's aircraft
machining and passenger-seat production earnings account for just 17 percent
of its business. Nevertheless, the firm continuously applies technologies from
one industry to another. By learning to make lightweight, durable military ejec-
tor seats, for example, the firm made significant improvements in commercial
transport seat design. It sells its seats to aircraft equipment suppliers and
primes worldwide. Both commercial and military aircraft seat technology
made possible new designs of lighter Shinkansen, or bullet train, seats neces-
sary to facilitate announced plans to speed up the trains. More fuel-efficient
buses also resulted. The company has also leveraged its reinforced fiberglass
and composites technology into aircraft and nonaerospace business. Aircraft
manufacturing led the company to purchase a large autoclave, with technical
assistance fromn a Japanese prime, to produce composite and fiberglass miateri-
als. Building in part on the knowledge it obtained, the company now constructs
an impressive array of composite products, from aircraft fairings to ski-lift can-
opies, and from bus bodies to cars for Tokyo Disneyland attractions.
4. A final example illustrates nonaircraft commercial spin-onl capabilities.
One of Japan's most successful textile firms is also a highly sophisticated air-
craft component supplier, specializing in fuel injectors and flight control.
equipment. Approximately 25 percent of the company's sales are in aerospace;
the remainder are in textile equipment. robotics, and industrial machinery. The
production of robotic transfer gear systems, the firm discovered, actually in-
volved tolerances more acute than aircraft parts specifications. Further, many
of its foreign competitors or licensers were unversed in state-of-the-art nonair-
craft manufacturing techniques and therefore were unable to learn from pro-
cess innovations made in other sectors. To improve efficiency and quality, the
firm began to adapt its nonaircraft quality control and process techniques to its
aerospace operations. dramatically increasing the quality and reducing the cost
of its products. In turn. the firm achieved a commanding presence in certain
segments of the world aircraft market in which it competes. In at least one
case, the company is now a sole source of flight control equipment for a major
overseas commercial aircraft program: in n1miany others, it is one of two or three
remaining sources worldwide.
Japanese horizontal, vertical. military/commlnercial, and aircraft/nonaircraf't
diffusion markedly cntrasts with U.S. experiences. Competition among
American priies (does not ensure that losers in the process share in military
_ __
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and commercial projects;: they rarely exchange information or know-how more
extensive than requests for price quotes with their subcontractors (although
they do collaborate, of necessity, in design with their specialist subsystems
suppliers); and most studies suggest that interdiffusion between military and
commercial or aircraft and nonaircraft functions is comparatively rare today.
As one analyst notes, "Even among those firms [that have defense and military
divisionsJ there is very little integration at the plant level between the defense
operations and the civilian operations.""
American subcontractors and suppliers, however, can and do mix commer-
cial and civilian aerospace technologies and machinery, but they have been
generally unable to apply their skills in nonaircraft business.'"" Unlike the Japa-
nese, who have found that there is often very little distinction between meeting
customier needs in either the aircraft or other industries, comparable inter-
sectoral iversification has eluded U.S. suppliers and subcontractors. Many,
such as one first-tier U.S. supplier, admit that their firmns lack the confidence
that they can make a successful foray into industries "where standards are
lower.""' A survey of U.S. dcf'cnse and aerospace subcontractor capabilities
by an American defense consultant came to a similar conclusion.
The foraging. casting (foundry) and fastener industries share several im-
portant characteristics. In each of these industries, firms which manufacture
products for the defense industry do so almost exclusively for defense and
aerospace customers. The products they sell are manufactured in very small
quantities and are of high quality relative to products sold in ... commercial
markets.... As a consequence of the specialized production equipment, test
equipment, and labor and management skills required to manufacture these
products, these firms are generally unable to compete in commercial mar-
kets for high volume, low technology products. Although they are techni-
cally capable of making commercial products, they are usually unable to do
so in an economic fashion. At the same time, firms which manufacture in
large volume for commercial markets are usually unable to compete in de-
1()9. While it is often asserted that in the early postwar period military and commercial technol-
ogy diffused quite rapidly at the prinme level in the United States. most studies have concluded that
this process has become less evident in the current period. There are numerous examples of efforts
by defense firms to convert to commercial products that have failed, including Gnrmman's effort
to build canoes and then city buses, and Rockwell's attempt to enter the aircraft overhaul business.
Most studies of this issue conclude that there is very limited integration at the plant level or at the
division level betwcen commercial aind defense activities of prime U.S. contractors. See, for cx-
amlple. Alic et al. (1992): Gansler (1989. 1984).
110. Unlike U.S. primes. for instance, studies show aerospace subcontractors in fact often per-
form military work jointly with commercial business. A survey of Puget Sound defense suppliers,
for instance. showed that over 75 percent of the subcontractors in the region sold less than half of
their output to the military or in military projects (Sommers, Carlson, and Birss 1992). Field stud-
ies of aircraft subcontractors and suppliers in both Los Angeles and Washington also demonstrated
that nonprime U.S. manufacturers frequently combined defense and nondefense aerospace work
with the same facility as did the Japanese (Los Angeles and Puget Sound field studies. January
1992). See also Kelley and Watkins ( 992) for sunrvey research that demonstrates significant dual-
use activities among metalworking subcontractors.
iil. Puget Sound field study. January 1992.
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fense and aerospace markets because they lack the necessary skills and
equipment. In those instances where it may be possible to manufacture a
product, it generally cannot be done economically, again because of the in-
appropriateness of the equipment, the people and the organization to do
the job."''
Most striking in this analysis is that virtually all of the matter-of-fact conclu-
sions explaining why aircraft and nonaerospace production are incompatible
apparently do not apply in Japan. Indeed, Japanese producers routinely
achieve profoulnd intcrsectoral diffusioll.
7.4.3 Nurturing-Assuring that Technology Higllway Travelers Stay
in the Race
We now turl t tthe third strand of Japan's tcchnoilogy and security ideology.
the importance of nurturing irmis that can indigenize and diffuse technology.
Through a variety of' means, Japanese companies are afforded substantial re-
sources to assure tat, as thcy master industrial capabilities, they have suffi-
cient stability to exploit wihat they have learned. We earlier referred to this
system as an ecolomy of protocols: while pursuing individual ends, players in
Japanese industry are caught in a web of mutual obligations or "reciprocal
consent" that moderates the chance that fratricidal competition, rapacious in-
dustry consolidations. or external cyclical market shocks will threaten their ex-
istence." 
We have already discussed some of the features of the protocol economy
apparent in te aircraft industry. These include (I) the system of work sharing
that virtually ensures that each Japanese aircraft prime contractor participates
in every major aerospace project; (2) joint collaborative research consortia,
such as the ATP project, which spreads public R&D funding across the widest
possible range of industry players; and (3) networks of suppliers and subcon-
tractors that leverage stable vertical and horizontal business into technological
and market advantag;es.
The effects of Japan's protocol economy in nurturing opportunities in the
aerospace industry can be further appreciated by focusing on a specific region,
Kakamigahara in Gifu prefecture, which has been a center of Japanese aircraft
production since before World War II. Kakamigahara illustrates how Japanese
primes and their subcontractors accommodate each other's needs to generate a
stable economic environment in which indigcnization and diffusion can pro-
ductively occur.
Kakamigahara is home to KHI's main airframe production and assembly
facility, the Gifu Works, which employs about four thousand workers and ad-
joins a Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) air base. T'he region was one of
112. Institute I'or D)clcnsc Analysis (199(). 3). (Contrast this finding to Kclley and Watkins
1992).
1 13. Ron;ald I)orc calls this "relatioll contracting:' See I)ore (qX7. 1()9-92).
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the major ighter production centers in Japan during World War II. Major post-
war military projects in which KHI has participated as a prime or subcontractor
at the Gifu Works are shown in table 7.4.
In addition, KHI is a contractor for 737, 747, 757, A-32 1, and MD- II pro-
duction. is a principal participant in the FS-X and 777 development projects,
and has perft'ormed extensive overhauls of close to six thousand commercial
and militlary aircraft since 1955. The firm is the second largest Japanese aircraft
prime contractor, accounting in 1990 for 29 percent of' the aerospace produc-
tion of the nation's top six firms and 11 percent of Japan's total defense con-
tracts ( 15() billion yen). Its aircraft sales, exclusive of jet engines, more than
tripled in '1981-90, rising from just under 60 billion yen to over 200 billion
yen during the decade. Additional KHI factories in Akashi, west of Kobe, and
Tobishinma, south of Gifu, produce aircraft engines and assemble 767 fuselage
components, respectively."4
Surrounding KHI is a network of suppliers and subcontractors with long-
term roots in Kakamigahara. Most of its principal suppliers of components,
subsystems, or materials are organized into a "cooperation committee" popu-
larly known as Kawvaji. In addition, KHI's thirty-six primary local subcontrac-
tors are organized into a regional production association called the Kawasaki
Gifit Kyvdo Kumliai. "s The kumiiai represents a typical Japanese organizational
innovation in which competing firms stabilize their relationships with key cus-
tomers and each other, but do not constrict their industrial options.
Japanese aircraft manufacturing was suspended during the U.S. occupation,
a devastating event for Kakamigahara's wartime aerospace subcontractors and
KI-."'' By 1948. however, newly reconstituted and renanied, KHI had devel-
oped a bus dlesign. the KBC-l, around which the regional production network
reformed."' Many of the former subcontractor managers, often working of ne-
cessity in the retail or restaurant business, began to reopen small machine
shops to participate in the region's new bus-building activity."'
In 195 1, the twenty-two largest subcontractors organized into the Kawasaki-
Gifit Seisakujo K)'6toku Kijo Kyi5d5 Kuniai (literally, Kawasaki-Gifu Collab-
orative Association of Cooperating Factories) to address two problems."9 The
114. KHll financial and promotional material for the Gifu Works. 1991.
I 115. Details on the regional organization of KHI suppliers and subcontractors are from several
sources: Kawasaki Gifu Ky6di Kutliai (1990); Kakamigahara Shiyakusho (1987); Sanemoto
(1989).
116. During the war, aircraft production was accomplished in the forerunner to KHI. which bore
a different name. For simplicity we refer to KHI here for each of these entities.
11 7. Kakamigahara Shiyakusho (1987. 691-94).
1 18. Kakamnigahara ficid study. December 1991.
I 19. Kutiai also perform numerols other services: (I) building ap;rtment dwellings for mem-
hber employees: (2) conducting tchnology seminars for members: (3) serving as a focal point for
other industries to contact suppliers in the region; (4) conducting political lobbying and liaison
with local. regional. and national bureaucracies: and (5) organizing social activities such as bowl-
ing clubs. travel. and so forth (Kawasaki Gifu Ky6id Kumnini 1990. 10-24).
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Table 7.4 Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Gifu Works, Military Prime and
Subcontracting Project Participation, 1959 to April 1, 1991
Period of
Type Kind of Aircraft Manufacture Remarks
Fixed-wing aircraft T-33A jet trainer 1955-58 210 planes
l'2V-7 A\SW patrol airplane 1958--5 48 planes
F-1)4J jet lighter 1961-67 207 planes (coproduction)
YS-l I medium transport plane 1962-72 182 planes (coproduction)
P-2J ASW patrol airplane 1967-78 83 planes
F-4l-J jet lighter 1969-81 138 planes (coproduction)
C- I mediui transport airplie 1970-81 31 planes
P-3C ASW patrol airplane 1978- 66 planes
F-.15J fighter 1978- 140 planes (coproduction)
Boeing 767 passenger airplane 1978- 388 planes (coproduction)
T-4 niedium trainer 1985- 56 planes
EP-3 utility airplane (EW) 1988- I plane
Helicopters Kawasaki-Bell 47 1952-75 439 helicopters
Kawasaki-Vertol 107 1 IA 1963- 160 helicopters
Kawasaki-Hughes 369 1969- 300 helicopters
Kawasaki BK 117 1982- 343 helicopters
CH-47 1986- 28 helicopters
Missiles Type 64 antitank 1964- ATM
Type 79 antilanding craft/antitank 1979- H-ATM
Type 87 antitank 1987- NM-ATM
Space equipmlent geodetic satellite 1986-
Repairs fixed wing 1953- 3.990 planes
helicopter 1954- 1,993 helicopters
Stuircc: Kalvwa;aki leavy Industries. promiotional dat:l. (if WVorks ( 191).
first, and most critical, was to ensure that KHI did not try to allocate work to
select subcontractors due either to personal favoritism or in an effort to drive
down contract prices. The kluiniai operated as a collective interface with KHI,
establishing basic expectations regarding contract procedures and work vol-
ume to which the entire region would adhere. In addition, the ktmniai forged
close alliances with regional, prefectural, and national authorities to create po-
litical resources with which to protect their interests. As their business relation-
ship developed, KHI and the kumiriai became enmeshed in a multilayered net-
work of local and national contacts that precluded destabilizing, unilateral
actions on both sides. Indeed, the extent of the kumniai's ability to form visible
links with influential political authorities can be appreciate in its forty-year
commemorative publication of 1990. The handsome 152-page book offers
messages of personal congratulations from the acting MITI minister, the
Chubu region MNITI bureau chief, the governorof Gifu prefecture, the head of
the national small and medium enterprise association, the head of the Coml-
merce Manufacturing Union Central Bank (a public snmall-firm lending institu-
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tion), and the mayor of Kakamigahara.' 2" From an early period, the kumiai
members exploited their opportunities in the Japanese protocol economy to
induce KHI to make long-term business commitments to their region.
The second goal was to facilitate joint applications for financing."' Despite
their close contacts with KHI, itself affiliated with one of Japan's major keiretsu
groups, none of the kumiai members received investment or other financial
support from the firm or affiliated banks. They relied instead on family equity,
retained earnings, and local bank financing to build and expand their busi-
nesses. To reassure regional banks during the postwar industrial slump, kumiai
members applied for loans as a group, combining their collective manufactur-
ing and management expertise into a single package.' 22 They also benefited,
like subcontractors in other industries, from the specialized regional financial
institutions Japan created to fund sophisticated equipment purchases and capi-
tal expansion undertaken by smaller firms."' Consequently, Kakamigahara
subcontractors organized to avoid price and wage exploitation by the region's
dominant economic enterprise while collaborating to secure independent capi-
tal from dedicated small-firm lenders, as was true of other lower-tier producers
throughout early postwar Japan.'
The result was a set of vertical and horizontal links that fostered the skills
and stability of Kakamigaharas aerospace subcontractors in several ways.
First, as we described above, KHI and its subcontractors maintained substan-
tial personnel, management, and training contacts that helped indigenize and
diffuse technology, especially licensed production techniques, in the course of
mIilitary and commercial projects. The commitment to mutually foster business
opportulities also Icled KHIl to share the burden of aircraft production cutbacks
more or less equally with its subcontractors. Unlike U.S. practice, no one in
Kakamigahara could recall an instance where KHI used its suppliers as a
buffer for economic shocks, retracting work to maintain its internal operations
at the expense of its subcontractors. Nor could they remember a case where
KHI refused to place orders with a kumniai member because of past production
problems; rather, the preferred solution was for KHI to maintain business vol-
unle while insisting on improved performance.'' 5
The subcontractors also used their stable relationship with KHI as a spring-
board into new industries and business networks. They initially diversified
their production among various KHI divisions, especially aircraft and bus bod-
120. Ibid.. 2-9.
121. Kakamigahara Shiyakusho (1990, 701).
122. Kakamigl;lara ficid study. December 1991; Kakamigahara Shiyakusho ( 1982. 701).
123. Friedman (1988. 192-95). Aircraft subcontractors in Kakamigahara also rely almost exclu-
sively on regional hanks rather than the t,shi gink3. or other kcircts affiliates of the primes (Ka-
k;lmigahara field studY. December 1991).
124. For details of Japan's postwar political struggle between small and large firms and the
regional organizations subcontractors developed and utilized to obtain protection from larger
firms, see Friedman ( 1988, chap. 4-5): Nishiguchi ( 1989. chaps. 3-4).
125. Kakamigahara ficld study. December 1991.
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Fig. 7.1 Kakamigahara Kawasaki Kyod6 Kurniai bus bodies and aircraft
business volume, 1951-89
SouIcc: Kawlsaki. Giftu Kyrd6 Kumiai (1990. 128).
ies. By tile mid- 198()s, nineteen of the thirty-five members participated in both
the bus and aircraft divisions of the kianiii. This enabled the subcontractors to
shift tlhecir KHI production from one division to the other in response to market
trends. Betwcen 195 1 and 1966, for instance, while aircraft subcontracting lan-
guished, bus-body production sustained the regional network. From 1967 on-
ward, bus and aircraft manufacturing were largely complementary. During the
oil-shock-indulced 30 percent slump in KHI aircralt production of 1977-80,'"
for example, ktniai bus output almost doubled; as kumliai aircraft subcon-
tracting grew almost 300 percent from 1983 to 1989. bus production fell by
nearly 5() percent. as shown in figure 7. 1.
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Kumniai members also diversified their relationships with other aircraft and
transportation producers and by entering other industries. In the 1950s and
1960s, the region's subcontractors relied on KHI for close to 80-90 percent of
their work. By the early 1980s. however. just 35.9 percent of kulriai total sales
were KHI-related. Over 10.5 percent of their work was with other aircraft pro-
ducers, notably MHI and IHI, and 18.9 percent was with the automobile indus-
try (table 7.5). At the same time, average kutiai member reliance on KHI for
sales fell. Only 31 percent of the member subcontractors relied on KHI for
more than 51 percent of their business (table 7.6).
Stable relations with their leading customer, KHI, therefore enabled Kakam-
igahara's subcontractors to diversify while maintaining their ties to the region's
aircraft industry. Collectively, they were able to exploit aerospace industry
tcchnological and financial resources while pursuing other options. Some of
the kniti members simply used aircraft work to fill in cyclical production
gaps that occurred in their primary business. For these firms, aircraft work
afforded more financial than technological resources. Others actively sought
to utilize aircraft technologies or process techniques in nollerospacc sectors:
their participation in the industry enhanced their overall manufacturing capaci-
ties. And by continually participating in and mastering military aircraft produc-
tion techniques through licensed production, the region's firmns developed skills
that have made them increasingly competitive in commercial aerospace as
well. New factories are springing up throughout Kakamigahara as the region's
subcontractors. anticipating large increases in 777 subcontracting, smoothly
shift from defense to civilian production. As military procurement languished
in the late 1980s, large increases in international commercial project work gen-
erated for the regional aircraft industry a subcontracting growth rate of close
to 300 percent for the decade.
The Kakamigahara experience contrasts squarely with American aircraft in-
dustry practices. Most U.S. primes do not form enduring regional ties or gener-
Table 7.5 Distribution of Total Sales by Kumiai Members, 1981
%, of Total
Kuiniai
Ktaniai Members' Customers Member Sales
KHI bus body. parts, and assembly 24.3








S,,t'1cc: K;lk;lligahara Shiyakusho ( 1985. 704).
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Table 7.6 Kumiai Member Reliance on KNlI Bus/Aircraft Sales (percentage of
total sales)
Degree of Reliance on KHIl






Sorcec: Kakamiiiahara Shivalkusho (I 985. 7()4).
ate "sticky" industrial regions; instead they actively shop for social or labor
concessions from their suppliers by threatening to move, and actually moving,
production to other states, regions, or countries-a process that unsettles thou-
sands of aerospace jobs and hundreds of subcontractors. There are few, if any,
arrangcllclnts in whlicil local subcontractors collcclively buildl regionl and na-
tional political and industrial networks to bargain with U.S. primes. Interfirm
information exchanges between primes an(l machining subcontractors are usu-
ally limited to the circulation of blueprints to several firms simultaneously for
bids. Subcontracts must continually lobby teams of non-technically trained
buyers at the prime even to get on a bid list. let along receive an order. Buyers
move trequently from division to division and to otier firms; when they do,
subcontractor links with the primes can rapidly deteriorate. When asked, few
American subcontractors can articulate the basis on which bids are accepted;
in some cases award-winning subcontractors in oce year can suddenly find,
to their surprise, that their work has been cut off in the next.' "7 And while
Kakamigahara is flooded with investment for an expected surge in 777 orders,
Puget Sound subcontractors who traditionally have close ties to Boeing have
seen their work cut back so severely that many took the unprecedent step of
confronting Boeing publicly with the problem.': s
The cutbacks even prompted one of the luckier first-tier Boeing subcontrac-
tors to note that "they [Boeingl expect us to take over and maintain the links
with second-tier companies. But my [subcontractingj shops are going bankrupt
so fast that soon we'll have no one to subcontract to up here [in Puget
Sound I." ''"
127. Puget Sound field study. January 1992.
128. There have been several accounts in the popular press about the tension between Boeing
and Puget Sound subcontractors. See Seattle NVecw- 7ii,ict. December 30. and June 21. 1C991;
Seattle P'.sr Irntellicnct:: June ,22. 199 1. According to published accounts. there arc several poten-
tial explanations for the Pugct Sound subcontracting work fall off. including (I) Boeing's apparent
efforts to direct rclationships to a smaller number of suppliers: (2) growing cfforts to subcontract
to non-Pugct Sound regions such as Wichita. Kansas. or Tennessee: (3) moving work to foreign
countries. including Japan: and (4) reducing costs by putting pressure on area subcontractors.
129. Ihid.
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Kakanigahara therefore suggests how'the protocol economy sustains air-
craft industry producers in the game so that technology and skills accumulate
and al11 difftusc(l to IlCwv Ilise tlhrollhout Japan's production network. It is not a
story of altruism or culture. but of novel organizational forms and incentives.
'lle aircraft indLustry has indigenized technology, has diffused it broadly, and
is organized to help assure that domestic beneficiaries are able to exploit what
they learn. Even though it has not yet produced (and may not produce for sev-
eral years) a competitive fly-away commercial or military aircraft, the Japanese
aircraft industry is nevertheless successful because its leaders value an industry
both fo'r its ability to foster and spread knowledge and far the products it
makes. They are willing to commit substantial public and private resources to
maintain industries that meet these criteria, where American practice would let
them die. In the process, not only does Japan build its core economic capabili-
ties. but it also is able to embed an increasingly Sophisticated defense produc-
tion network in the commercial economy. In the final section, we consider
some of the industrial and strategic implications of this achievement.
7.5 Conclusions
7.5.1 Ideology Matters
As we discussed above, defense and aircraft are but additional lanes on a
very busy Japanese technology highway. Despite often vigorous postwar de-
bates about how to build and maintain these lanes, it long ago became clear
that commercial and dual-use technologies are racing ahead of' purely military
applications in Japan and in the United States. Some may argue that Japan's
achievements in this regard are accidental or that Japan enjoyed a "free ride"
on U.S. security guarantees during the Cold War. Still others may credit Japan's
strategic vision in fostering a dual-use economy.
But none of these "explanations:' we believe, sufficiently account for the
institutional and strategic choices Japan made in generating its dual-use capa-
bilities. Other nations, enjoying similar security alliances with the United
States and in similar strategic circumstances, have evolved quite different dual-
use capabilities. It is also difficult to credit accident with an industrial outcome
that is so strikingly consistent with Japan's fundamental set of beliefs about
security and the interdiffusion of technology. Finally, while Japan's particular
defense industry strategies have in fact varied widely over the last century, it
has nevertheless sought, if often in an ineffective and halting manner, to realize
the touchstones of Japan's tcchnology and security ideology: indigenization.
diffusion, and nurturance.
The Japanese experience therefore shows that beliefs about national security
and technology affect decisions about industrial structure and the way a nation
evaluates its comparative global strengths and weaknesses. Japan, we believe,
values industries differently than does America. Japan's security and tcchnbl-
1IBP r)ll I---- -- - - .i. . I
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ogv ideology fosters a national consensus so basic that it is now unquestioned
by virtually all industrial and political actors-that industries have importance
beyond the goods the produ(lce. Acting oi this belief. the Japanese are driven
to procure or dcxclop skills and knowledge thatt they may lack for their domles-
tic economy so that nonproduction benefits-cspccially learning and diffu-
sion-can he realized at home. Industrial policy in Japan is guided by the
effort to maintain the nation's knowledge and technology base rather than to
produce a specific product to which a domestic firm might affix a nameplate.
In the United States, by contrast, companies displace one another in conmpe-
tition for markets or contracts, leading to wholesale capacity losses, or even
complete domestic skill displacement from the American economy, which
Japan would never tolerate. While many argue that the production conse-
qcuences of these losses are, in fact, beneficial if overall prices fall, this position
ignores the potential long-terml loss that may result from the knowledge diflf'u-
sion, skill developmnent, and commercialization that will not occur. As we have
seen in the aircraft industry, Japan is willing to pay (and pay dearly) for the
same technical knowledge that the United States is willing to transfer abroad,
because Japan values the ancillary industrial results of that knowledge as
much, or mnore than, the ability to make specific goods.
There is. moreover. a vast gulf between U.S. and Japanese thinking about the
importance of maintaining industry support mechanisms to nurture competent
firms to which technology has been transferred and diffused. While Japan ex-
erts signilicant efforts to assure that opportunities to form alliances, compete,
and exploit learning in different ways are preserved by reducing fratricidal and
exogenous market shocks, America believes that whole regions, sectors, and
industries can be "given up" in the hope that new industries will emerge. But,
compared to firms nurtured in systems like Japan, which consistently build
skills and networks over time, U.S. producers may be successively weakened
as they experience unshielded market shocks that are not shared by their over-
seas competitors.
The ideological divergence between U.S. and Japanese technology and se-
curity thinking is particularly apparent in the post-Cold War era. As the U.S.
defense industrial base contracts, losing certain skills and failing to exploit
commercial opportunities, the Japanese increasingly build dual-use capabili-
ties and purchase what the Americans have incentives to discard. This is as
true in defense as it is in other sectors. Japan maintains and secures across-
the-board manufacturing and design technologies from abroad in a bottom-up
strategy; the United States is now contemplating cutting all but top R&D func-
tions in the defense industry on the theory that manufacturing skills are gener-
ally) fungible.
Consequently. %where American ideology drives firms and policymakers to
seek the cheapest components regardless of the structural or domestic eco-
nomnic conselquences, their counterparts in Japan-operating tinder a different
set of beliefs--are llotivated by a concern to obtain,. diffuse, and nurture tlhe
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broadest possible spectnlm of skills. This striking variation in basic principles
and resultilng industrial choices between Amncrica and its principal economic
comipetitor ought. we believe. to give U.S. policymakers pause. If Japan is to
be our guide, the United States lay)' be undervaluing the knowledge production
and diffusion benefits domestic manufacturing networks generate. If so, a pub-
lic policy concern is to ensure that indigenous production networks-in de-
fense as in other sectors-are not sacrificed in the operation of current Ameri-
can industrial strategic thinking. Instead. it may be necessary to intervene to
protect tle nations manufacturinig networks, foster more effective collabora-
tion among both prime contractors and their suppliers, and seek much more
substantial access to foreign manufacturing networks. especially in Japan.
7.5.2 A Dual-Use Defense Industry Possible, if Not Essential
The postwar instability of domestic demand and the political impossibility
of developing arms exports markets has led the Japanese defense industry to
describe itself' ruefully as "neither dead nor alive" (ikas(ant v lli, krosallit °
ni). '"1 By some measures this assessment may be correct. Although the defense
industry's share of total industrial production in Japan has increased slightly
since 1970, it is still less than I percent of total industrial production."' In
sales, the defense industry in Japan is on the scale of the nations sushi shops
or bakeries.
But these measures greatly understate both latent Japanese defense capabili-
ties and the country's achievements in "embedding" a military production sec-
tor within the commercial economy. By relying on the skills of its commercial
producers to obtain and master dual-use technologies, as we described in the
case of' aircraft, Japan has generated dramatic absolute growth in its military
sector. One percent of 1970 Japanese GNP is not the same as I percent of
1990 Japanese GNP. In any case. if Japanese defense spending is recalculated
according to NATO standards (including pensions, aid, ad other items that
the Japanese exclude in order to stay under the nominal I percent ceiling),
Japan actually spends 2 percent of its massive GNP on defense.' 2 Despite
the formal ceiling on defense expenditures that obtained until 1986. defense
spending was either the first or second fastest growing item in the national
budget throughout the 1980s- a decade during which the total budget more
than doubled. Since the nlid- I 960s defense spending expanded between 5 and
8 percent each year, anrid Iactual JDA spending has risen froml 300 billion yen
to Imore than 4 trillion yen."' By 1984, Japan had the fourth largest naval fleet
in the world, and by the late 1980s, its defense budget was third in the world.
Thus, by the time Japan slowed down its defense buildup in 1993, it had built
1 30. Kanlta ( 1 979. 205).
1 3 . Japan iDefcnsc Agency ( 1990).
1.32. Dcklc (1989): Tomiyama ( 1982. 26).
I .13. I ichO . .. Kikakuhtu ( 191. 37).
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a formidable dcfense capability in spite of Severe domestic political and inter-
national handicaps.
More importantly. unlike U.S. economic policymakers, the Japanese have
never believed that silicon chips and potato chips are the same." ' ' Differences
between sushi and Sidewinders and between bread and ballistic missiles are
profound in Japanese thinking. but not for the obvious reason that some build
while others destroy. As we have described in the case of aircraft, the Japanese
are convinced that advanced technology has a strategic value beyond its inimme-
diatc application. Guided by this belief', the Japanese try to assess how indus-
tries contribute to the national standard of living in general. This has been
true in defense as well as commercial sectors, where Japanese procurement
decisions have helped to foster domestic networks and skills as well as mili-
tary readiness.
The result has been the creation of a defense sector that appears particularly
suited for the post-Cold War world. It might once have been arguable that
Japan's defense industry choices were unsuccessful: Japan could hardly have
defended itself from potential enemies such as the former USSR or even China
without the equipment that the United States produced. But the view that Japan
possesses a dysfunclional defense industry is losing favor as the Cold War
ends, and clear, long-terni military needs are being replaced by fuzzy, highly
variable security options and threats. In such a world, the capability to mix and
match specific design or production skills to meet military challenges, or to
sustain cutting-edge technologies without bankrupting the public treasury, is
becoming mtore valued than the ability to stamlp out hunidreds of guns, tanks,
or fighters in publicly supported defense firms. Analysts are beginning to ac-
knowledge that the absence of specialty aircraft makers, to cite one key ele-
ment of the defense industry, is an advantage for Japan.' 35
They also have begun to acknowledge the growing confidence of the Japa-
nese to nmeet national defense needs and to compete with other nations by
exploiting the military capacities its commercial firms maintain. After decades
of indigenizing. diffusing, and nurturing, Japanese defense production, like
Japanese defense technology, is largely indistinguishable from Japanese indus-
try as a whole. As a result. Japan is starting to appreciate that its best commer-
cial producers could easily become the best military producers as well. The
chairmen of Honda and Sony each became honorary chairmnen of the Japan
Defense 'echnology Association in 1982. As Ibuka Masaru, the chairman of
Sony (and a former Naval Air Arsenal researcher) claimed when asked by the
head of the Japan Defense Technology Association what targets should be set
in order for Japan to achieve an autonomous defense technology base, "lIt does
134. This ialhgvy is lsu, ulv credited t Richardl I);armi. the chief ec:oim ic p dlicy advisor to
prcsident, Reagan amdl lu,h.
135. Niltm Kik ai . I Kiin ( I9( 1}I. 7.
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not matter what the targets are.] for as long as targets are set for us. we can
build anything at all'." '
Japanese defense capabilities show that military manufacturing can occur in
networks of commercial firms, a capability that is now the goal of the United
States as defense firms contract and attempt to convert to other purposes. But
to have an indigenous defense production base embedded in the commercial
economy like the Japanese, a full-spectrum commercial capability is essential.
Without an effort to build and sustain lower-tier, sophisticated manufacturing
networks in the United States, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to embed
American defense capabilities in the commercial economy as the Japanese
have done. Each of the pieces of upstream and downstream production must
mesh into a seamless network from which defense capabilities precipitate.
Security, the Japanese experience suggests, means more than bombs or miis-
siles. It also means knowledge, and a diverse top-to-bottom manufacturing
economy is, in effect, a huge knowledge generator for the whole society. There
is a direct relationship between a nation's economic capabilities and its technol-
ogy and military security. America is only beginning to recognize this rclation-
ship much more explicitly in tile post-Cold War environment.' -'
7.5.3 Strategic Use of Partners
Japanese firns and the Japanese government have defined their relationships
with both domestic and foreign partners in strategic terms, consistent with the
security and technology ideology we have described above. One Japanese
scholar refers to Japan's international partnering strategy as involving a "two-
track" policy: inviting foreign companies into relationships that could transfer
technologies or enhance areas of Japanese weakness, while simultaneously
building autonomous capabilities to supplant foreign dependencies.",,
Donlestic firms have evolved a system of protocols that ensure stability and
shared risk. "Winners" do not "take all:' nor do losers come away empty-
handed. Relationships among prime contractors and between prime and sub-
contractors are exceptionally stable and-by U.S. standards exceptionally
interdependent. Prime contractors rely more than ever on the innovations of
their subcontractors, and each exists in a complex network of alliances. The
final assembly by prime contractors of components and equipment supplied by
vendors and subcontractors masks extensive material, supply, and fabrication
relationships. As we discussed above, prime defense contractors are directly
responsible for only a fraction of Japan's arms and aircraft production.
The indigenization of both prime and subcontractor capabilities in Japan has
been a phased process. While the defense industry was buffeted by clear policy
shifts first toward and then away from domestic development, it was buttressed
i 36. Asahi Shimnbunsha ( 1987, 150).
137. Secc speech by Prcsident Clinton at the Westinghouse Electric Corporation. Bethesda. MD.
1March II. 1993.
138. Inoguchi (1991. 93).
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and stabilized by a consistent technonational ideology. Even if Japan would
not develop certain weapons systems due to political and fiscal constraints-
such as the PX-L antisubmarine warfare plane that fell victim to Lockheed
bribery in the 197()s-it has taken every opportunity to maximize learning
from licensing.
At the samne time, U.S. firms often obtained more significant revenues from
licensing than from selling actual military products. The willingness to pay
such premiums must be understood as part of Japanese industry's strategic use
of foreign partners. Aircraft and defense technology transfers have been in-
bound for decades. Foreign partners are selected, not to supply cheap parts,
but because they are willing to supply expensive knowledge. International
cooperation, the euphemism for foreign licensing, has never been an end in
itself; in the twentieth century, as in the nineteenth century, it has been a
convenient Ineans of learning the manufacturing processes that underlay the
design and production of desired products. Foreign licensing has always
been a second choice to domestic development, and it has served to close
gaps in Japanese manufalcturing technology while enhancing domestic capa-
bilities in military as well as civilian areas. The Japanese strategic use of
foreign partners is a major challenge for conventional American practices as
well.
7.5.4 Rcciprocity. Not Protection
Building an indigenous "full-spectrum" commercial economy that will also
sustain U.S. defense capabilities is not simply a domestic problem. Rather, as
the growing foreign interpenetration of American supply networks demon-
strates, it is also a Inatter of regulating the flow and effects of overseas products
and technology into the country. This may involve two seemingly opposite
goals. First, to provide the kind of support and nurturing that has stimulated
long-term, stable skill development in countries like Japan, U.S. firms may
have to be shielded in some fashion from external shocks-including foreign
competition-while domestic networks are rebuilt. At the same time, however,
to obtain access and indigenize technology from abroad, the United States
must avoid naked protectionism that would alienate its foreign partners. In
short, the United States will have to develop its own version of the subtle blend
of strategic cooperation and domestic technological nurturing the Japanese
have practiced for decades.
The threat that American industrial reversals will foster crude protectionism
is especially troublesome. Protectionism only ensures that, as Japan's technol-
ogy highways (and those of other rapidly developing economies) become even
more fully articulated, American access will be increasingly difficult and
costly. Further, the day has long passed when the United States could expect
to control or dominate world technology by retarding the flow of skill and
know-how abroad. To do so now would be politically costly and would likely
fail. Nor should America a'nt to be isolated from overseas technologies, an
- ------------ -I--~--~-~-`~~~---~-~--~-.
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outcome that would only ensure the nation's eventual obsolescence and gener-
ate even more profound commercial and defense consequences.
Instead. the task is to develop a rough parity with other nations in domestic
full-spectrum indigenization. diffusion, and nurturing capabilities. There are
several policy levers for achieving this goal. One is to spur U.S. firms to partner
strategically Fwith foreign producers to obtain technology flow-backs-that is,
to obtain and then diffuse technology in the United States just as Japanese
and other nations' producers have done with American know-how in the past.
Another is to recognize the express connections between technology, knowl-
edge, and national security and leverage America's substantial international
contribution to international stability-especially in the Pacific Rim-for re-
ciprocal access to manufacturing networks abroad. If global power increas-
ingly turns on industrial capabilities, the United States will lose its capacity to
bargain in the world if it ftils to link itself more effectively with foreign econo-
mics in ways that assure that state-of-the-art technologies flow into its domestic
cconomy and are exploited.
The Japanese clearly understand the subtleties involved in maintaining an
open economy while seeking national advantage. They recognize that their
bargaining power with other nations requires nurturing and indigenizing ad-
vanced technological capabilities. Restrictions of access to technology rou-
tinely accelerate Japanese efforts in both respects: "The United States has re-
cently begun to increase its restrictions on technology transfer, and there has
developed an increased severity of the environment hemming in the Japanese
aircraft industry. We cannot expect the sorts of easy technology transfer we
have experienced until now. So, it has become an indispensable premise that
above all else we achieve world levels of autonomous technology by undertak-
ing international joint development.":'I' To the Japanese, building future op-
tions for accessing international networks while also localizing industrial capa-
hilities is as essential a security task as manufacturing fighters or tanks.
Nurturing without becoming predatory and indigenizing without protection-
isni is a delicate and difficult task. one made more challenging by the need to
insist on reciprocal treatment and access to technology networks-manufac-
turi ng associations, consortia, and regional networks-in countries like Japan
that have little experience sharing.
Nevertheless, the stakes involved may require that the United States con-
tinue to press at every level for reciprocity and access-while pursuing the
necessary domestic initiatives-so that at the least a stable balance of technol-
ogy diffusion and indigenous capabilities with other dominant nations can be
achieved. In the post-Cold War era, technology differentials will continue to
affect each nation's defense capabilities. But more than in the past, a nation's
defense skills will depend on the strength of its commercial economy. If differ-
entials in commercial capabilities are allowed to widen, enriching manufactur-
139. Nihon Kikai ... Kikin ( 1 991. 2).
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ing networks in one nation while they atrophy in another will result in unac-
ceptable national security implications. The cnrucial task for the United States
and Japan is to restructure their historical roles regarding bilateral technology
diffusion while maintaining rounds for collaboration rather than conflict. Dif-
ficult though this goal might appear in an age of escalating transpacific recrimni-
nations, the likely alternatives appear much less attractive.
7.5.5 Regional Implications
Resolving current and potential conflicts attributable to divergent national
technology and security ideologies is also essential for Asian stability. Bilateral
United States-Japan disputes are merely one instance of more general prob-
lemns centering on technology sharing and access that are likely to affect U.S.-
Asian. Japancse-Asian, and regional relations in the future.
The pattern of American aerospace technology and product exchanges with
Japan is strikingly similar to those involving South Korea, Taiwan, and South-
cast Asian states. Both Taiwan and Korea have insisted on increased technol-
ogy developmecnt roles for military projects with the United States, starting
first with licensing and then codevelopment. They also actively seek to lever-
age their defense comiponent and manufacturing capabilities to supply the U.S.
and global defense and commercial aerospace industries.'40 In 1991, a Taiwan-
ese company nounted a bid, backed in part by government funds, to purchase
a stake in McDonnell Douglas's commercial transport (aircraft) operations.
Countries as diverse as Singapore and Indonesia have discussed, or are devel-
oping, similar licensing and developmental strategies.''
The use of licensing and subcontracting to build domestic skills that can
facilitate increasingly advanced defense and commercial capabilities exists
throughout tie world. But unlike Europe, where American and European mu-
tual defense supply network interpenetration and close political collaboration
promotes at least the appearance-if not the reality-of reciprocal U.S. tech-
nology access. American industrial interaction with Asian nations has gener-
ally not produced reciprocal technology flows. As in Japan, U.S. producers are
technology suppliers, prime contractors, and component consumers. Should
North and Southleast Asian economies substantially penetrate the U.S. defense
supply base, or obtain growing shares of the global commercial aerospace
business. many of the same tensions that are likely to afflict U.S. and Japanese
relations mlay well recur throughout the region.
Consequently, even though the political and security contexts, and industrial
140. For an exccllent review of the Korean defense industry "partnership strategy." which in-
volves the goals of (I ) supplying components to U.S. defense firms and using offsets to induce
local subcontracting by American primes. (2) exporting components worldwide, and (3) collabo-
rating in wcapon technology devclopment. see Office of Technology Assessment ( 1990. 133-36).
A description of Taiwan' s indigenization and diffusion efforts. centering on the codevelopment
with Gencral I)ynamics of a two-engined fighter based on the F- 16. the IDE or Ching Kuo. and
governmcnt plroiitii( ol d rcfcnsc-commcrcial industry linkages. is also found at 170-74.
141. Ibid.. 164.-70.
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capabilities. of other Asian countries are very different fornm Japan, the basic
issue of ensuring reciprocity and preserving a full-spectrum commercial base
to support defense requirements will likely be a dominant concern for the
United States in the region. Moreover, should Japanese multinationals increas-
ingly knit the Asian region's industrial base together, purely bilateral U.S. and
Japancsc technology and security conflicts could well he exported throughout
Asia.
Japan must also learn how to offer specific, effective reciprocal technology
access to preserve its own interests in Asia. Japan's role in the region is the
reverse of its historical position relative to the United States; it is a supplier,
not a consumer, of technology and know-how from its Asian partncrs. As such
it has to learn new formns of interaction with its neighbors, for as we have
discussed, Japan's technology and security ideology may uneasily accomnio-
date the transfer and sharing of industrial capabilities or opportunities. This
possibility has led many Asian countries to question whether their participation
in Japanese manufacturing networks could adversely affect their long-term do-
tmlestic capabilities and thus their security interests. The result has been in-
creasingly contentious efforts to force Japan to transfer technologies or to con-
dition Japanese direct investment on reciprocity and commitments to create
local business opportunities.'4 '
The close and growing correlation between technology, domestic capabili-
ties, and security may therefore drive conflict and realignment in Asia. This
will likely compel America to develop strategies for obtaining reciprocity and
preserving its industrial base that go beyond bilateral concerns with Japan.
Japan may find that its economic efforts in Asia could be stalled if its commit-
ment to share and develop technologies in a genuine partnership with other
nations is widely questioned. Rather than observing the development of a new,
Asian regional "bloc" economy, technology and security concerns could well
provoke new alliances among the United States, Europe, and Asian states. The
successful creation of reciprocal technology networks, or highways, could be-
come the critical factor shaping future Asian political and economic relations.
If so, technology and security issues will transcend the U.S.-Japanese bilateral
relationship, and will be crucial to the stability and welfare of the Asian region
as a whole.
142. A central point of contention between South Korea and Japan. for instance,. was technology
transfer. and many Korean companics arc now canceling tie-ups with Japancse finns that have
lasted for years. Singapore reportedly has also begun restricting Japanese investment in semicon-
ductor facilities, absent Inore extensive technology sharing and transfer. Even in Malaysia. a coun-
try oftcn cited as one (of the scminal "look East" nlatiolls that actively prefer Japancsc invcstment
over U.S. or uropcan tics. bilateral conflict over Japanese subcontracting, technology transfers.
a;ed local business development has erupted. Sec. for cxanplc. tich account ,f N;laysian-Japanllcse
striggles to ldevclop ventuiires in autiomohilcs and steel i Machadlo ( 19(1)).
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Appendix A
Tablhe 7A.1 lajor Japanese Foreign Airframe Subcontracting, )y Firm and
Project, 1991 (including helicopters)
Firm Aircraft Components
I. Mitsubishi I Ic;avy Industries





















inboard flaps: landing gear door
actuator
landing gear door aclua;tors: fuselage
longerons valves






inspar ribs: outside laps
outboard laps
lrward, miiid fuselage: cargo doors;
flap actuators: wing ribs
flap actuating section tiiring covers
main reduction gears





3. Fuji Heavy Industries
747 rudder. ailerons. and itting siheets:
spoilers
757 outside laps
767 fairings: main landing gear door






















landing gear actuating cylilnders/
hrake control valves
alilCer'tl actlu;lors: n:oe laInling ge;it
stecritnl, actuator
ailet :i actulatOl'S yw danlpcr
Boeing
- ~~~-------`- ~~~I----------- -- ·-- ~~---·-- -- - - ----- I -.1- -----













brake control and fuel reverse flow
prevention valves
aileron adjustment equipment;
spoiler actuators; fuel cut-off valves
aileron adjustment and cargo door
actuators: gearbox























737. 757. 767 ti,
I1. Furukawa Aluminum
757.767 al
thrust reverser control valves
valves, nose landing gear steering
equipment




ivatory tlttduls ;and uel tltanks
omposites
vater tanks
taniuri and steel forgings
luminum forgings; cxtrustions
12. Japan Airline Manufacturing Company
757 galleys: elevators; carbon fiber pipes
727. 737. 747. 767 galleys
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Table 7A .1 (continued)
Firm AircraIft Components
Airbus A3)/3 I()












737., 747. 757., 767 sc
:Ose landing gear actuating
)mponents
uiding gear actuating equipment
e;t exchangers and air coolers
:ading lights
,ats
20. Tokyo Aircraft Instruments
737 gyro horizons
757. 767 spare altimeters
21. Shinko Flectric
Boeing 747, 757, 767
Boeing
Boeing
cargo and general motors
22. Tenryul Ilndultries
727. 737. 747. 7(,7 seats
23. Japan Aviation Electronics
737 accelerometer 
757. 767 accelerometers; flight panel
displays: air data inertial reference
systeml
24. Toshiha
767 instrument display CRTs
25. Sony
Boeing












A300/A3 10 = 3
A300/A340 = I
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Appendix B











Improved techniques of process control. in-
spections. vendor control. etc.
Had impacts on a wide range of civilian in-
dustries
Became a major turning point for improving
the quality of electronics products
Improved production systems operation and
design
l)esign Tcchnologies
Large-scale helicopters Improved the designing of speed governors
for ships and transmissions
F- 1)4 hydraulic system Improved high-pressure pipes and coupling 
for comnmccial vehicles
Ink recordcr I lelped devciopmcnt of ink-recorder oscillo-
graphs Ifor microquality measurement
Antivibration. antishock products Became available for general electronics con-
trol systems
'lmntalumn condenser commission devel- Enabled Japanese domestic test of con-
opment denser
'I'st/productiomn of gyroscopes Contributed to the development of precision
equipment
Ground-air telemeter transponder Contributed to the development of communi-
cation microwave technologies
Designing of aircraft heat exchangers Contributed to the development/mnass pro-
duction of car hcaters that use exhaust gas
Jet-engine hearing manufacturing tech- Contributed to the development of durable
nology railcar bearing
Application of aircraft gas turbine to ships Expandcd the applicability to electric genera-
tors and ships
Aircraft measuring equipment technology Enhanced the quality of general high-class
measuring equipment
Ceramic brake fining for F-104 Applied the lining technology to buses and
other general vehicles
Connector technology Applied to railcars
Shield beamn lamp Applied its major characteristics-high illu-
mination. small size. light weight. and du-
rability-to general-purpose products
Itigh-pressurc oil lilters Contributed to the improvement of filters for
automobiles and machine tools
li igh-pressure hose for F- 104 Improved the quality of general-purpose
hoses
ligh-teniperaturc fuel Contributed to the improvement of tank tes-
ter techniques for designing large-scale.
high-pressure test chambers
a. I--i--· ·--··I ----· LL^1LIII-II
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Table 7A.2 (continued)
Tcchnology - Spillover Efl'ccts
Manufacturing bolts for F- 104 engines
(J-79)
Mlanufacturing self-locking nuts for aircraft
Domestic production of navigation equip-
ment and gyroscopes




Improved the quality of bolts for automo-
biles
Improved the quality of self-locking nuts (es-
pecially ones with nylon) for automobiles
Improved the inertial navigation technology
Applied to simulators for other areas (e.g..
railway. automobile)
Improved overall hydraulics control
Applied to other informnnation-processing
equipment to be used to process radar in-
formation






Speed limit :,;surancc Ictin g of T- I ,\
Donimcstic production of aircraft material
tligh-pressure tllchnology used for F- 104's
h1dra;ulic
Automatic wirinll test technology
Module lechnology
Wiring identilicatiom
Electrolytic manufacturing method for tur-
binc rotor for air gas hard processing
turbine
Welding echnology for rcket chambers
Adhesive techlltldg including honeycomllb
structure
Alumiinum welding techinllogy
Prevention o!' bacteria crrosion of metal
products
Adhesive technology for aircraft copper. anti-
heat ;altv. :;,td tlta-hlact shields
Jet engine parts proccvssing techtology
Jct engine part, I orging tcclhnology
Technologies
Inmproved the quality of precision servo-
valves fir general-purpose soil-pressure
equipment
Applied to range of other transportation test
and measuring equipment
Improved overall materials technology
Improved the hydraulics technology for in-
dustrial products equipment such as
plunger pump motors
Applied comlputer-aided test technology to
other equipment
Applied module assembly/manufcturing
technology to other equipment
Applied baking method to other tcchnolog-
ies and antiheat wirings
Applied to the molding of general-hydraulic
equipment material
Achieved JIS 2-class technology and im-
proved the overall quality ,of welding
A\pplied to general-purpose equipment such
as staIle pancl and bus door
Applied t(o the manufacture of gencral-pur-
pose heat exchangers
Improved the technology to prevent bacteria
corrosion of metal products
Applied adhensive technologies for antiheat
alloys to automatic generation and magne-
to-hydro dynamics generation
Applied cutting and molding technologies in
other industries
Applied to industrial gas tturbine parts
`-`-`-----`1----11------- ---- ---" ---_ I
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Ial)le 7A.2 (continued)
Technology
Aircraft parts electron discharge method
(EDM1) 





I leat treatment technology
J-5X engine ignition system
'Ichnology For plating nickel onto alutii-
num plate used for J-79 ignition
Military dual-side-printed circuit board
Special CRT technology
Spillover Effects
Applied to industrial gas turbine parts pro-
cessing technologies
Applied to special processing treatment of
industrial products to reduce engineering
tasks
Applied to the installation of industrial oil-
pressure control chambers and to cyl-
inders
Contributed anticorrosion and high degrees
of precision to the development of special
metal-plating technologics for industrial
products
Applied high-reliability spot-welding to in-
dustrial products
Ilproved stability in heat treatment for in-
dustrial products
Applied to antivibration. antishock trcat-
ment by reducing size and weight
Applied to other industrial products in reduc-
ing si7.e and weight of parts
Manufactured through-hole. circuit boards
commercially
Contributed to the enhancement of high-
definition CRT technology
Other Technologies
Explosive forming technology ued for F- 104 Applied forming technology for metal pro-
fuselage parts cessing. leading to the widespread use of
large-scale presses
Duct hose used for F- 104 Applied to the auto industry
()-rings for aircraft Applied to the general-purpose oil-pressure
equipment in other industries
Disk brakes for jet aircraft Used in automobiles and rapid railways
Plastic tooling introduced for F-86 Used for automobiles and engine turbine
blades
Anodizing process developed for F-86 Increased durability and reduced weight for
other machine parts
Reinforced plastic developed for F-104 Used in YS- Ii and MU-2. as well as in
buses, automobiles. and general-purpose
machinery
F- 104 chelical mlling technology Applied to other machinery processing to
cut costs
Jet engine bearing technology Used for bullet trains
lMentor Trainer oil cooler technology Improved heat exchangers such as general-
purpose radiators. car coolers, and car
heaters
Snurce.;: Kcidanrcn F6ci Scisan lilkai (1965. 285): B6ci Kiki Sangy6 Jittai Ch6isa linkai (1968.
81-84 ).
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